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The Definitions of Income
JOHN R. BROOKS*
I. INTRODUCTION
What is income? Perhaps you know it when you see it, but defining
income in a comprehensive, rigorous, and coherent way is very diffi-
cult, if not impossible. Economists, tax scholars, policymakers, and
others have struggled with the income concept for well over a hundred
years, with no solution in sight. Instead, we have many different defi-
nitions of income for different purposes-income definitions for taxes,
transfers, measurement of national production, measurement of
household resources, measurement of individual wellbeing, health
care subsidies, student financial aid grants and loans, and more.' Even
within the Code, there are several different measures of income for
different purposes. 2 Each concept serves a specific goal, but none is
truly comprehensive, nor can any be.
In this Article, I explore in depth the conceptual difficulties
presented by the income concept. Because a truly complete and rigor-
ous definition of income is impossible or unworkable, we must make
decisions about what the practical simplifications will be. This means
that any operative definition of income is essentially a political choice,
even when we claim to be using a pure definition, and any definition
thus inherently incorporates normative views about, for example, jus-
tice, social policy, and economics. Ultimately, "income" is whatever
society wants it to be in order to achieve a result that the democracy
believes to be appropriate and just. Including some items of income
in "income" but not others means that those items become the focus
of normative comparisons between individuals, while others are
ignored.
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I am grateful to Stephen
Cohen, Lilian Faulhaber, Miranda Perry Fleischer, Brian Galle, David Gamage, Itai
Grinberg, David Hasen, James Hines, Mike Seidman, and participants in workshops at the
University of Michigan, Georgetown University Law Center, the National Tax Association
2015 Annual Meeting, and the Association for Mid-Career Tax Law Professors (2016)
Conference for helpful comments, conversations, and suggestions.
1 See Part II.
2 See, e.g., IRC § 61 (gross income), § 62 (adjusted gross income), § 63 (taxable income),
§ 55(b)(2) (alternative minimum taxable income). There are several different definitions
for "modified adjusted gross income." See, e.g., H§ 24(b)(1), 36B(d)(2)(b), 86(b)(2),
135(c)(4), 221(b)(2)(C).
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Income is thus a constructed idea, inherently driven by policy objec-
tives and pragmatic concerns. From the standpoint of taxation, that in
and of itself is not necessarily a problem, nor is it surprising. It is of
course well understood that most legal concepts and rules are con-
structed ideas that embody policy choices.3 The particular danger
here, however, is that the increasing hegemony of the tax concept of
income has second-order effects, because the choice of a tax base can
also end up being a choice about a broader "index of equality."4 Be-
cause we can only study what we measure, income-and, as I show,
largely a tax-driven construction of income-has become the yardstick
by which we make normative comparisons between individuals, and
by which we measure the effects of a broad range of policies and insti-
tutional forces. But because the definitions of income themselves in-
corporate policy decisions, we can inadvertently ignore or even
entrench the effects of those decisions when we use those income defi-
nitions for other purposes, especially in areas where they do not
belong.
To see the problem with defining income, consider the following
puzzles, familiar to most students of basic taxation: Homeowners earn
a return from their own homes, which ought to be considered income.
The home produces a return just like any other asset-but the return
is in the form of housing. If I live in a home that I own, I avoid having
to pay rent elsewhere, and that savings is a benefit to me-a net accre-
tion to my wealth. But that return goes untaxed-even though the
value of that housing benefit would be taxed if instead I rented the
home to a third party.
The failure to tax imputed rental income is considered a big hole in
the tax base. Treasury treats the exclusion of net imputed rent from
owner-occupied housing as the second-biggest tax expenditure, cost-
ing about $100 billion a year in lost revenue.5
A similar problem in income taxation is the imputed income from
self-provided services, especially child care and housework. Providing
child care oneself generates imputed income, since the parent thereby
avoids paying cash to a third party. As with owner-occupied rent, if
the parent paid a child care provider to watch his children while work-
ing himself as a child care provider outside the home, both payments
would be taxable, and the result should not be different just because
the parent provides the care to his own children, rather than someone
else's.
3 See, e.g., Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35
Colum. L. Rev. 809 (1935).
4 See Part VI.
5 Treasury Dep't, Tax Expenditures 9-10, 33 (Nov. 11, 2015), https://www.treasury.gov/
resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/Tax-Expenditures-FY2017.pdf.
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Like the nontaxation of imputed rent, the nontaxation of imputed
services is a pervasive and important problem. It likely accounts for at
least some of the relatively low labor force participation by women,
for example, since it is often cheaper after taxes for a mother to pro-
vide child care herself than to pay someone else to enable her to work
outside the home. 6 Empirical studies have shown that secondary earn-
ers in a household are particularly responsive to marginal tax rates, so
this effect could be quite large.7
But what is often left out of these commonplace discussions is how
far the imputed income logic can go. If I am earning imputed rent
from my home, what about from my car? My furniture? My com-
puter? My dishwasher? My dishes? And if a stay-at-home parent is
earning imputed income from self-provided child care, what about
lawn-mowing? Cooking? Shaving? Or even providing parental ad-
vice? Each of these things is a valuable good or service that has or
could have a market price, and the logic behind imputed rent and
child care services applies equally to these other goods and services.
And these are the simple problems-as I discuss below, problems of
psychic and capital income compound the issue significantly. Once
these forms of income are included, it is not even clear what income is
any more.
This conceptual difficulty of defining income comprehensively is an
old problem. The puzzles above are versions of Kleinwachter's Co-
nundrums, posed by the German fiscal theorist Friedrich von
Kleinwachter in 1898 to attack the very idea of income taxation.8
Henry Simons is usually read as effectively rebutting Kleinwhchter,
but as I show here, Simons did not resolve the most difficult issues.9
Moreover, one of Simons' lesser-known purposes was to reject defini-
tional arguments in the first place.10 Arguments over what is and is
not "income" elevate accounting operations, he wrote, and can make
us lose sight of the fact that an income tax is ultimately a tax on indi-
viduals according to their economic wellbeing.11
6 See, e.g., Grace Blumberg, Sexism in the Code: A Comparative Study of Income Tax-
ation of Working Wives and Mothers, 21 Buff. L. Rev. 49, 69-71 (1971).
7 See, e.g., Nada Eissa, Taxation and Labor Supply of Married Women: The Tax Re-
form Act of 1986 as a Natural Experiment 9-13 (Nat'l Bureau Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 5023, 1995), http://www.nber.org/papers/w5023.pdf; Emmanuel Saez, Joel
Slemrod & Seth H. Giertz, The Elasticity of Taxable Income with Respect to Marginal Tax
Rates: A Critical Review, 50 J. Econ. Lit. 3, 3-4 (2012).
8 Friedrich Ludwig von Kleinwichter, Das Einkommen und Seine Verteilung (Income
and Its Distribution) (1898) (unpublished trans. Hannelore T. McDowell, on file with the
Wake Forest University Law School Library); see Part II.
9 See Part II.
10 Henry C. Simons, Personal Income Taxation: The Definition of Income as a Problem
of Fiscal Policy 59-80 (1938).
11 Id. at 76-85.
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Early courts also struggled with defining income, and it was not un-
til 1955 that the Supreme Court held that the Sixteenth Amendment
authorized taxing a broad and expansive concept of income from
"whatever source derived." 12 One of the first early debates in the
courts was over the treatment of stock dividends in Eisner v. Ma-
comber,13 a question that appeared to divide Simons and another
early-twentieth century economist, Edwin R.A. Seligman. 14 Simons
viciously attacks Seligman's argument that stock dividends cannot be
income under the Constitution, but ultimately reaches the same con-
clusion on pragmatic grounds.15 In a sense, Simons ignores his own
advice and is seduced by the definitional argument, while dismissing
its usefulness at the same time.
This same issue-disguising policy choices as something more nor-
mative or theoretical-pervades two other prominent debates in the
literature: the roles of a "comprehensive tax base"16 and of tax ex-
penditures.17 Boris Bittker appears in both debates, making strong
arguments against reliance on some "pure" definition of income,18 but
the errors he points out still linger, as evidenced by the Joint Commit-
tee on Taxation's failed 2008 project to reform tax expenditures analy-
sis.19 These debates underscore further that income is a constructed
concept, as are the purported normative baselines to which we com-
pare our actual tax base.
Income definition issues also arise in interpreting optimal tax the-
ory, because economists working in the Mirrlees framework have
adopted a particular, and narrow, definition of income different from
that used by other economists and legal scholars for other purposes. 20
In the Mirrlees framework, the social planner is often described as
wanting to tax ability to earn income, rather than income itself, since
that would avoid the distortion from taxpayers substituting leisure for
labor.21 But because the social planner can only observe and tax ac-
tual income, information asymmetries arise that can lead to labor/lei-
sure distortions and deadweight loss. Optimal income tax theory asks
12 Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 432 n.11 (1955).
13 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
14 Simons, note 10, at 85-89.
15 Id. at 203-04.
16 See Part III.
17 See Part IV.
18 Boris I. Bittker, A "Comprehensive Tax Base" As a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80
Harv. L. Rev. 925, 985 (1967); see Part III for additional commentary.
19 Staff of the Joint Comm. on Tax'n, JCX-37-08, A Reconsideration of Tax Expenditure
Analysis (May 12, 2008), http://www.jct.gov/x-37-08.pdf; see Part IV.
20 See James A. Mirrlees, An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation,
38 Rev. Econ. Studies 175 (1971).
21 Mirrlees, note 20, at 175.
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how to maximize social welfare given these forces, and the models
suggest how to "optimally" tax income-most famously, the Atkin-
son-Stiglitz result, which is sometimes interpreted to mean that the
social planner should not tax capital income at all.2 2
But optimal income tax theory is not free from the same defini-
tional ambiguities that bedeviled early legal scholarship. The defini-
tion of income in optimal tax theory-generally labor earnings that
are a function of ability and effort23-is quite different from both the
Haig-Simons definition used by other theorists and the actual defini-
tion in the Code. 24 And that choice of definition is driven by the par-
ticular policy concerns of the researchers-namely minimizing labor/
leisure distortions and the need for a mathematically tractable way to
model the social planner's information problems.25 The results that
flow from the models depend in large part on these prior decisions
about how to define income. Different definitions could produce dif-
ferent results, however. Thus a measure of caution is needed in inter-
preting the results of the theory.
To underscore the point that there is no single definition of income,
and that even practical definitions can differ greatly, I also analyze
and compare a dozen different income concepts used by government
agencies for various purposes, such as economic analysis or distribu-
tion of transfers.26 The depth and breadth of this comparison is, to my
knowledge, unique in the literature, and it reveals a surprising amount
of variation, as well as a surprising amount of uncertainty-the defini-
tions of income are relatively opaque, especially in the details. De-
spite this variation, however, the definitions also show a core
connection to adjusted gross income (AGI), the tax measure of in-
come. Several of the income definitions are just modifications to
AGI; others are surveys that refer respondents to tax returns, and
others rely in part on tax administrative data in constructing their
measures. The tax system's choices of how to measure income thus
reverberate into nontax areas, meaning that tax policy choices can in-
advertently affect nontax policies.
I conclude by examining some of the leading economic studies of
income inequality, especially by Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez.
Piketty and Saez rely on tax administrative data to measure income
inequality, in order to measure top income shares where survey data is
22 A.B. Atkinson & J.E. Stiglitz, The Design of Tax Structure: Direct Versus Indirect
Taxation, 6 J. Pub. Econ. 55 (1976); see note 126.
23 Louis Kaplow, The Theory of Taxation and Public Economics 54 (2008).
24 See generally Part II; IRC § 61.
25 See, e.g., Kaplow, note 23, at 54-56.
26 See Part VI.
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lacking. 27 But I show that this choice raises significant questions
about the way they measure both levels of income and income shares.
These issues are implicitly acknowledged by a paper by Piketty, Saez,
and Gabriel Zucman, which leans more heavily on survey data, espe-
cially from the Census Bureau, to get a fuller picture of income distri-
bution.28 The need to rely on multiple sets of data is further
reinforced by a competing line of income inequality literature.29
This Article makes several contributions. First, it provides a critical
examination of the intellectual history of the income concept, span-
ning from 1898 to the present day, and incorporating materials from
the legal, economic, and policy literatures. While necessarily incom-
plete, it is still the most comprehensive overview in the literature to
date, and yields several important insights. Second, this Article pro-
vides a close reading of the optimal tax theory literature to challenge
some of the overly simplistic ways in which it is sometimes inter-
preted, especially in the legal literature. Third, it provides a uniquely
broad and deep examination of twelve different income concepts used
by the federal government, and the pros and cons of each. This is
material that is necessary for any analysis of income data, yet has not
appeared in the literature prior to date. Finally, the Article shows the
growing hegemony of the tax concept of income-AGI-and de-
scribes the risks (and some rewards) of applying that concept outside
of tax.
This Article proceeds as follows. In Part II, I critically review some
of the early intellectual history of the income concept, especially the
role of Simons and his famous statement defining income. Part III
examines and recasts the prominent mid-century debate over the com-
prehensive tax base. In Part IV, I do the same for the tax expenditure
debate, highlighting especially the failure of the Joint Committee's
2008 reform project. Part V turns to optimal income tax theory, to
explain how policy choices embedded in the optimal tax models influ-
ence the interpretation of the models. Part VI expands beyond in-
come taxation to examine other income definitions and concepts, but
also shows the long reach of the tax definition of income. This Part
27 Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, Income Inequality in the United States, 1913-
1998, 118 Q.J. Econ. 1 (2003).
28 Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Distributional National Ac-
counts: Methods and Estimates for the United States, 133 Q.J. Econ. 553 (2018).
29 See especially Richard V. Burkhauser, Jeff Larrimore & Kosali I. Simon, A "Second
Opinion" on the Economic Health of the American Middle Class, 65 Nat'l Tax J. 7 (2012)
[hereinafter Second Opinion]; Jeff Larrimore, Richard V. Burkhauser, Gerald Auten &
Philip Armour, Recent Trends in U.S. Top Income Shares in Tax Record Data Using More
Comprehensive Measures of Income Including Accrued Capital Gains (Nat'l Bureau
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23007, 2016) http://www.nber.org/papers/w23007.pdf
[hereinafter Recent Trends]
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also reviews the work of Piketty, Saez, and others. Part VII
concludes.
II. THE DIFFICULTY OF DEFINING INCOME
The problems with defining income are as old as-if not older
than-the income tax itself. In this Part, I review some of the early
intellectual history of the income concept, focusing on the work of
Kleinwachter, Seligman, and Simons. Simons is sometimes portrayed
as resolving important definitional questions, but, as I show here, all
he does is either dismiss them or rephrase them. The same questions
remain with us today.
A. Kleinwitchter's Conundrums and the Problem of Imputed
Income
The challenge that imputed and psychic income pose to a rigorous
conception of income has been known since at least the nineteenth
century. The mid-to-late-nineteenth century was the beginning of the
widespread shift from property taxes and customs duties to income
taxes as the biggest source of government revenue, and early fiscal
theorists, especially in Germany, struggled to come up with a clear
definition of this new tax base.30 A particular example of the diffi-
culty that has played an important role in English-language tax theory
are what sometimes are called "Kleinwdchter's Conundrums," dis-
cussed by Simons.31 Because Kleinwdchter's criticisms continue to be
trenchant over 100 years later, and because the Haig-Simons income
definition is a direct response to them, I review them here in detail.
Kleinwchter presents the straightforward logic for why "income"
must include items of imputed or psychic income. He starts by saying
that income clearly cannot be just cash income, since one could also
be enriched by commodities and other noncash property and benefits,
such as room and board for a household servant. 32 And, if that is so,
then "income" must also include intangible items, like property or
contract rights. And if these commodities and rights received exter-
30 See Simons, note 10, at 59-80 (reviewing earlier attempts).
31 Id. at 52-53.
32 Kleinwichter, note 8, at 3 ("Actually, as far as the concept of income is concerned, it
is of no importance whether the individual receives cash in hand with which he will buy the
necessary food items, the clothing and other things which are needed in life; or if all these
items in question are delivered to his house in kind, because in both cases some kind of
goods came into his household from the outside.") (All Kleinwichter page references are
to the McDowell translation.)
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nally can be income, so must commodities and rights produced within
a household, like a farmer growing his own food.33
At this point, once income includes tangible and intangible goods,
and goods produced both outside and within a household,
Kleinwachter declares, "one has reached a point where the concept of
income has become so watery and ethereal that absolutely nothing
can be done with it in practical life." 34 He then proceeds with his
famous Fliigeladjutant example.
Suppose, he says, that there is a soldier who serves as the prince's
Fliigeladjutant, or aide-de-camp:
The aide-de-camp occupies an apartment in the princely resi-
dence which obviously is free of charge; heating and lighting,
understandably, are also free; one or two servants are as-
signed to the aide-de-camp from the princely household; he
takes his meals daily at the princely table; every evening he
sits in the box at the theater with his sovereign; he rides in
the carriage and rides on the horses of his master; he accom-
panies the ruler on all excursions and trips and takes part in
all festivities at court. In short, he leads a life as if he himself
were a prince, at the cost of the princely bureaucracy. 35
Clearly, says Kleinwdchter, this soldier has income to the extent of
these benefits, much more so than if he were just assigned a normal
post where he would receive little more than his wages. While this is
an extreme example, he goes on, the same logic would apply to any
job that includes payment or benefits in kind, such as a servant's room
and board or a private teacher's standing invitation to lunch (this be-
ing 1898).36
Treating in kind transfers as income raises difficult issues of identi-
fying and valuing the various benefits a person might receive, but
Kleinwhchter goes further. First, he asks: What if the aide-de-camp
actually hates all of these things? How should we consider these bene-
fits "if the continuing visits to the theater, concerts, balls, evening par-
ties (and so on) are a great bore; in short, if all of this is an
33 Id. at 5 ("[I]f, for example, a landowner rented his land for monetary rent and lived
on this rent in a city far away from his estate there could be no doubt, even by the limited
conception [of monetary income], that that man had a regular income. Now, compare this
landowner with a second one, who does not rent his properties, but rather cultivates them
himself and perhaps consumes the major part of the harvest of his estate directly. One is
forced to conclude, that this second property owner also, as well as the first one, has an
actual 'income."').
34 Id.
35 Id. at 6.
36 Id. at 7-8.
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exceedingly burdensome official duty to him?"37 How do we value
perquisites that are not benefits but rather burdens of the job, particu-
larly when such benefits and burdens are subjective?
Second, he asks, if all the goods and services that come into a
household are income, what about a meal at a friend's house, or even
"an offered cigar"?38 Would not these too be accretions to wealth, or
a flow of benefits? Finally-anticipating the "sharing economy" that
will appear over a century later-Kleinwdchter wonders about under-
used consumer durables and personal time. If one who stays in his
home instead of renting it out has imputed rental income, what about
someone who chooses to lie on his own "bed or divan and perhaps
read the most dreadful dime novels"? 39 Or a mother who chooses to
wash and comb "her little wild rascals" rather than earn cash by wash-
ing and combing another's? 40 And so on.
Kleinwachter underscores the absurdity of going to these extremes
by illustrating the distributional consequences. A poor family would
suddenly seem rich, because of all the services they provide to them-
selves, unable to afford alternatives:
[I]f then in addition, the heavens are as merciful as to send a
few long and hard illnesses into their home, during which
time the children are being nursed by the mother with self-
sacrifice of her own health, and if-which is the main point-
the people do not forget to register painstakingly all of those
services in their ledger as receipts because every service
could have been performed for strangers for money or, the
reverse, would have had to be bought for money from stran-
gers-thus, the ledger will easily show a sum of "receipts" of
several tens of thousands at the end of the year.41
In summary, Kleinwdchter makes three essential arguments against
the income concept. First, it is impossible to identify all the "inflow[s]
of satisfactions" (in Seligman's later phrase42) that a person accrues.
Second, even if we could identify these flows of satisfactions, the mea-
surement of such income is not feasible, since the satisfactions are
subjective and heterogeneous. Third, if we actually solved the first
and second problems, income would not serve well as an "index of
37 Id. at 8.
38 Id. at 9.
39 Id. at 9-10.
40 Id. at 10.
41 Id. at 10-11.
42 Edwin R.A. Seligman, Are Stock Dividends Income?, 9 Am. Econ. Rev. 517, 517
(1919).
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equality" (in Richard Musgrave's later phrase43) for making compari-
sons between households.
Ultimately, Kleinwachter concludes, income tax supporters have
"let themselves be deceived by the transactions of the businessman."44
Business income, he says, is an accounting shorthand to measure
profit and loss, but cannot be pressed into the broader measurement
of all individuals' inflows and outflows, particularly of intangible or
self-created goods, much less the psychic benefits of each. As Simons,
writing forty years later, says, "[t]he problem is clearly hopeless." 45
B. Simons' (Partial) Solution
Despite his pronouncement of the problem as hopeless, Simons
takes up the challenge of defining income, or at least appears to. His
phrasing of the definition has become canonical among tax theorists,
lawyers, and economists, but his treatment of the problem is more
nuanced and, at times, contradictory. 46 Simons defines income as
follows:
Personal income may be defined as the algebraic sum of (1)
the market value of rights exercised in consumption and (2)
the change in the value of the store of property rights be-
tween the beginning and end of the period in question. In
other words, it is merely the result obtained by adding con-
sumption during the period to "wealth" at the end of the pe-
riod and then subtracting "wealth" at the beginning. 47
He goes on to say that the "sine qua non of income is gain."48 Here,
Simons' main task is rebutting those who would define income as
merely an accounting measure of the differences between inflows and
outflows. 4 9 Simons rightly deserves credit for putting to rest that idea,
and especially for acknowledging that increases in wealth are just as
43 Richard A. Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance 161 (1959).
44 Kleinwachter, note 8, at 19.
45 Simons, note 10, at 53.
46 Victor Thuronyi also reads Simons as being contradictory and somewhat ambiguous,
though in a different way than I find here. See Victor Thuronyi, The Concept of Income,
46 Tax L. Rev. 45, 48-49 (1990).
47 Simons, note 10, at 50. This is typically called "Haig-Simons" income, because of the
similar formulation of Robert Haig. See Robert Murray Haig, The Concept of Income-
Economic and Legal Aspects, in The Federal Income Tax 1, 7 (Robert Murray Haig ed.,
1921) (emphasis omitted) ("Income is the money value of the net accretion to one's eco-
nomic power between two points of time.").
48 Simons, note 10, at 50.
49 See id. at 51 ("This position, if tenable, must suggest the folly of describing income as
a flow and, more emphatically, of regarding it as a quantity of goods, services, receipts,
fruits, etc.").
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much income as wages or the profit from sales. But, as he himself
acknowledges, his phrasing does not answer "the unanswerable ques-
tion as to where or how a line may be drawn between what is and
what is not economic activity."50
He then turns to some of the objections raised by Kleinwachter. As
to imputed income, including self-provided services like caring for sick
children, Simons largely assumes away the problem. First, he notes
(correctly) that "leisure is itself a major item of consumption,"51 and
that therefore we do not need to be concerned with identifying
nonmarket services. Whether one provides a service within the
household or-just sits around, one would be consuming the same
amount, in terms of an hourly wage forgone. 52 Second, he assumes
that "these elements of income vary with considerable regularity,
from one income class to the next, along the income scale."53 Be-
cause, Simons says, income is fundamentally a relative concept,54 we
can assume away those things that would not alter the relative ranking
of individuals.
But this move raises more questions than it answers. His argument
essentially is (1) that leisure and imputed income can be valued at the
same hourly rate as one's paid employment, and (2) that individuals'
hours worked either increase as one goes up the income scale, or at
least decrease slower than the hourly wage increases. As a result, we
can remove the hours spent in leisure or providing services in the
household without changing the ranking of income groups.
As to the first point, the inclusion of all hours, regardless of whether
spent at work, leisure, or otherwise, is another way of saying that we
should be assigning burdens based on someone's hourly wage rate,55
not their overall level of income-work effort and other factors that
go into determining total wages are not relevant (or at least not rele-
50 Id.
51 Id. at 52.
52 That is, if we value a person's time by his or her market wage, the imputed income
from providing household services or from leisure (as an item of consumption) is the
same-simply the hourly wage multiplied by the time spent at the activity.
53 Simons, note 10, at 53.
54 See id. at 49 ("[Personal income's] measurement implies estimating merely the rela-
tive results of individual economic activity during a period of time."); see also id. at 200
(noting that the income tax "is a tax upon persons according to their respective incomes
which, strictly, are merely estimates of their relative 'prosperity"').
55 In addition to my objections below, it is also not clear that this would be the right way
to value these services or psychic benefits. Researchers use many different methods to try
to value unpaid domestic services, and using the opportunity cost of the person providing
the services is only one such way. Other ways include measuring the market value of the
output itself (for example, child care) and valuing the labor based on the wages paid for
similar work. See, e.g., U.N. Econ. Comm. for Eur., Canberra Group Handbook on
Household Income Statistics 40-41 (2d. ed. 2011) [hereinafter Canberra Group
Handbook].
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vant in making comparisons). This presages the move by optimal tax
theory to focus on "ability" to earn income, rather than actual in-
come. 56 As I discuss in Part V, this is a normatively flawed basis for
taxation. But it also undermines the whole income concept if the logic
ultimately leads one to throw out "income" altogether and just look at
ability or the value of one's time. Simons is not saying that
Kleinwachter is wrong to consider imputed and psychic income-in-
deed, he essentially concedes the point, but just decides it does not
matter. But by doing so he implicitly redefines income itself.
As to second point, even if the general statement seems broadly
true with respect to income groups-with relatively few hours in a
day, it seems unlikely that the inclusion of a few more hours of im-
puted income and leisure would overwhelm differences in wages-it
ignores several important margins of comparison, especially within in-
come groups. What about an unemployed or underemployed person
who does not actually value their leisure time? What about the well-
known distortions resulting from the exclusion of imputed child care
services?57 What about just the simple comparison between two indi-
viduals with the same wages but who work very different hours?
Should an income concept necessarily assume away the differences in
those two individuals?
Moreover, ignoring nonmarket activities of households may give a
false impression of the income dynamics of a given household. For
example, if a household member shifts from providing nonmarket ser-
vices to providing market services, the household might appear to
have increased its income, when there has been no real change in eco-
nomic power. In part for this reason, the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi Com-
mission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social
Progress recommended expanding government income measures to
include nonmarket activity.58
With respect to the unhappy Fliigeladjutant and the problem of
psychic income, Simons makes a similar move as for imputed income:
"[A]gain, these elements of unmeasurable psychic income may be pre-
sumed to vary in a somewhat continuous manner along the income
scale." 59 But that move comes only after first underscoring
Kleinwachter's point. The Fliigeladjutant parable provides a stark ex-
ample of the need to value perquisites of employment, but the prob-
lem is not limited to members of a prince's court. Why not also the
56 N. Gregory Mankiw, Matthew Weinzierl & Danny Yagan, Optimal Taxation in The-
ory and Practice, 23 J. Econ. Persp., Fall 2009, at 161-64.
57 See notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
58 Joseph E. Stiglitz, Amartya Sen & Jean-Paul Fitoussi, Report by the Commission on
the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress 14 (2009).
59 Simons, note 10, at 53
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"prestige and social distinction of a (German) university professor[?]"
asks Simons. 60 Attempting to measure the subjective value of differ-
ent forms of compensation, Simons says, "would be the negation of
measurement." 6 1 Simons is again agreeing with the point-both that
these psychic benefits are income and that they are impossible to mea-
sure-but argues again that they can be ignored because they will not
affect the relative comparisons between individuals.
Again, this assumption is not at all obvious, especially with respect
to horizontal comparisons. A prison guard and a public interest law-
yer might earn similar wages, but surely earn very different psychic
benefits. Political candidates fight tooth and nail over relatively low-
paying jobs, implying that the power and prestige of the position is
quite valuable. And certain well-paying "pink collar" jobs continue to
have trouble attracting men likely due to a perceived lack of status. 6 2
There is enough heterogeneity of psychic benefits across jobs and indi-
viduals to make universal assumptions unreasonable.
To be clear, I am not saying Simons is definitely wrong, and that we
must include these items of income. Rather, the point is that Simons
does not fully address Kleinwichter's argument that a true compre-
hensive measure of income is unknowable or unworkable. The point
that I make throughout this Article is that any income definition nec-
essarily includes choices of what to include and what not, and Simons'
no less. His choice to ignore much imputed income, leisure, psychic
benefits, and the like may be entirely reasonable-but it is still a
choice. Simons' construction of his purportedly comprehensive in-
come definition hides many of those choices.
The irony is that, while Simons and his book are remembered
largely for his project of providing this purported comprehensive defi-
nition of income, the book has another, less well-known goal as well-
to advocate for less slavish resort to definitional arguments in the first
place. He says, for example, that when lawyers and economists put
too much stock in definitional arguments:
The numerical results of accounting operations are immedi-
ately reified; the discussion proceeds in terms of the income
tax as a tax upon income-like a tax on potatoes or mouse-
traps-and loses sight of the obvious fact that it is a tax upon
persons according to their respective incomes which, strictly,
are merely estimates of their relative 'prosperity.' 63
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 See, e.g., Claire Cain Miller, Why Men Don't Want Jobs Done Mostly by Women,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 2017, at A3.
63 Simons, note 10, at 200.
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The income tax is ultimately a tax on individuals, and "income" is
just a rough heuristic for what a given individual ought to pay. An
income tax is different from, for example, a direct sales tax or custom
duty, which is just a levy based on the market value of a transaction.
The goal with an income tax, as conceived by Simons and other early
theorists, was not just for the government to get a cut of market trans-
actions, but to attempt as best as possible to measure an individual's
ability to pay, and thus to determine how much of the overall tax bur-
den to assign to that individual. Rather than get caught up in trying to
define "income" in some pure Platonic sense, we should keep in mind
the underlying goal of the tax when constructing the definition of the
tax base-to, as Simons says, levy taxes on individuals relative to their
prosperity.64
The implication of this view is that an operative definition of in-
come is a policy choice driven by the underlying purposes of the tax,
not some exogenous idea of what "income" is. In the end, the best
rebuttal to Kleinwachter is that we do not need a pure definition of
income to make policy choices. But even as Simons makes that point,
he is still purporting to provide a technical-sounding comprehensive
definition of income involving "algebraic sum[s]" and "store[s] of
property rights." 65
As Simons acknowledges, all his definition does is change the ques-
tion. Instead of "What is income, and how do we measure it?"
Simons asks "What is consumption and accumulation, and how do we
measure them?" 66 But these problems are just as hopeless.
C. Stock Dividends and Eisner v. Macomber
The central tension of Simons is his robust defense of his own in-
come definition and attack on others' definitions, even while telling us
not to rely on definitional arguments in the first place. This tension
can be seen in his discussion of stock dividends and Eisner v. Ma-
comber.6 7 The argument over that case also demonstrates another of
the points of this Article: that. definitional arguments about income
are frequently arguments about something else, such as practical feasi-
bility, fairness, distribution, or economic efficiency, and that the defi-
nitions themselves generally follow from policy or political goals
rather than being prior to them.
64 Cf. Thuronyi, note 46, at 49 ("A careful reading of Simons suggests, however, that he
did intend his definition to flow, at least in part, from judgments about tax equity.").
65 See Simons, note 10, at 50.
66 See id.
67 See id. at 197-204.
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Simons devotes a large part of his book to a full-frontal attack on
Seligman and his treatment of stock dividends.68 Seligman was a U.S.
economist and fiscal theorist in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, and was an important intellectual figure behind the adop-
tion of a federal income tax in 1913.69 In 1919, the Supreme Court
heard the case of Eisner v. Macomber on the issue of whether stock
dividends could be considered "income" for tax purposes. 70 Congress
made stock dividends taxable in the 1916 Act,71 and the case chal-
lenged whether stock dividends could be considered income under the
Sixteenth Amendment.72 The case was argued before the Supreme
Court twice, and between the arguments Seligman published an arti-
cle in the American Economic Review arguing that stock dividends are
not income by definition.73
The article likely influenced the Court, which adopted some of Se-
ligman's arguments in holding that stock dividends were not income.74
While excluding stock dividends was a reasonable result on its own,
the case had ramifications beyond that limited issue, since it purported
to give a definition of income under the Constitution that was quite
narrow: "the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both com-
bined." The case is famous in large part for this error; the Court rela-
tively quickly began backing away from such a constitutional
limitation,75 before refuting it entirely in Glenshaw Glass.76
Seligman's argument is clearly flawed, as Simons makes clear. Se-
ligman starts off appearing to use comprehensive income definitions
similar to Simons and Kleinwichter. He says that income is "all
wealth that comes in"77 and "any inflow of satisfactions which can be
parted with for money. It may not be money income, but it must be
capable of being transmuted into money income."78 As Kleinwachter
pointed out, that is hardly a useful touchstone, since it would include
68 A stock dividend is just what it sounds like-a distribution by a corporation to share-
holders of stock in itself. If done pro rata, this has no net effect on shareholders, since the
new stock would not change their relative ownership of the corporation, nor would any of
the corporation's assets have left corporate solution. The only real effect is to move some
amounts from retained earnings to paid-in capital on the corporation's balance sheet.
69 See Ajay K. Mehrotra, Making the Modern American Fiscal State: Law, Politics, and
the Rise of Progressive Taxation, 1877-1929 (2013); Edwin R.A. Seligman, Progressive Tax-
ation in Theory and Practice (1908).
70 252 U.S. 189 (1920); see Seligman, note 42, at 517.
71 Revenue Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-271, § 2(a), 39 Stat. 756, 757.
72 Eisner, 252 U.S. at 199.
73 Seligman, note 42, at 536.
74 Eisner, 20 U.S. at 208.
75 See, e.g., Helvering v. Bruun, 309 U.S. 461, 468-69 (1940) (rejecting the constitutional
argument).
76 Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 430-31 (1955).
77 Seligman, note 42, at 517.
78 Id. at 518.
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things like strawberries picked while on a walk or parental advice to a
child.79
Recognizing that these definitions are "too vague,"80 Seligman goes
further. Because the question concerned stock dividends, the distinc-
tion between capital and the income from capital is central. Seligman
sets out to differentiate the two based on the idea of realization and
separation. If the income from the capital cannot be realized and sep-
arated from the underlying capital, he writes, it is at best "inchoate"
and more likely not income at all.8 1 He compares the lack of separa-
tion to, for example, a plumber choosing not to sell his services, or a
mare not yet pregnant with a foal.8 2 Realization and separation are
therefore "necessary attribute[s] of income" 83-that is, part of the def-
inition of income. Because a stock dividend does not involve any
value leaving corporate solution, there is no realization and separa-
tion, and therefore no income, by definition.
With this, Simons cannot abide. For several pages of his book, he
ruthlessly takes down Seligman's analysis. 84 He describes it as, for ex-
ample, a "parade of dogmatic assertions-put forward as necessities
of logic,"8 5 and states that "[i]n [his] emphasis upon the necessity of
realization, Professor Seligman has outdone even the accountants." 8 6
Simons also writes, "Certainly the phrase 'inchoate income' deserves
prominent place among the curiosities of economic terminology."8 7
While the tone is harsh, the points are fair. As Simons points out,
Seligman is inconsistent and imprecise, and several of his moves are
more assertions than arguments. (Seligman also has a particularly
weird section involving forests and trees.88) And he is right to be frus-
trated by an argument for excluding stock dividends on definitional
grounds-as we know, it led to almost forty years of confusion about
how broad or narrow the definition of income was for tax purposes. 89
One would think, therefore, that Simons took the contrary position
to Seligman-that stock dividends should be taxable as income. But
Simons later states in his book that the decision to exclude stock divi-
79 Kleinwachter, note 32, at 17.
80 Seligman, note 42, at 517.
81 Id. at 525.
82 Id. at 519-20.
83 Id. at 520.
84 For more on this debate, see Daniel Shaviro, The Forgotten Henry Simons, 41 Fla. St.
Univ. L. Rev. 1, 30 & nn. 169-71 (2013).
85 Simons, note 10, at 87.
86 Id. at 85.
87 Id. at 87.
88 See Seligman, note 42, at 524-25.
89 See text at notes 74-76.
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dends from income was "eminently sound." 90 "[T]here is here no
proper issue as to the meaning of income," he writes, "only a question
as to what constitutes a reasonable, consistent, and convenient appli-
cation of the realization criterion," a criterion which he thinks is likely
required for administrability reasons.91 He thus reaches the same con-
clusion as Seligman and the Supreme Court's opinion in Eisner v. Ma-
comber, but he incorporates a realization requirement on pragmatic,
rather than definitional, grounds. In other words, after trashing Selig-
man and others who put forward narrow definitions of income, he ul-
timately comes out in the same place, even if by a different path.
Moreover, one can read Seligman more charitably as struggling
with how to make sense of the distinction between income and capital,
which is a necessity in a realization-based tax system, and for what
events should constitute realization. Seligman and the Court in Eisner
v. Macomber make the mistake of reading realization into the Consti-
tution, but that does not change the fact that our system is based on
realization, and any functional definition of income needs to fit within
that. On this and the resulting treatment of stock dividends, Simons
and Seligman agree, but a reader could miss that in the heat of
Simons' attack. Seligman's mistake is to frame that issue as a question
of what income is and is not, but the analysis he follows is actually not
so different than Simons'. As long as we have a realization-based sys-
tem, we have to distinguish capital income from the capital itself, and
"separation" is as good a basis as any. Seligman dresses his argument
up as being about the definition of income, but it is ultimately driven
by practical considerations about administering a realization-based
system, just as it is for Simons.
Finally, the question of whether "gain" must be separated from cap-
ital to be income is not entirely a settled question today. As I discuss
in Part IV, many major income concepts do not include accrued (or
even realized) capital gains and losses, as distinguished from dividends
and interest, thus implicitly requiring "separation" for the income to
be included, just as Seligman argued. Moreover, the Canberra Group,
an important international commission addressing income measure-
ment issues, explicitly excludes both realized and unrealized gains and
losses from even its broadest, most conceptual measure of income (a
measure that includes nonmarket household production and imputed
rent). 9 2 Echoing Seligman's analysis, they write that "[asset] gains and
losses are excluded from income, whether they are realized . . . or
remain unrealized. Instead, they are treated as changes in net
90 Simons, note 10, at 198.
91 Id. at 199.
92 See Canberra Group Handbook, note 55, at 14-16.
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worth."93 Simons would say that any gain is income, Seligman would
say there is only income when that gain is separated from the capital,
but the Canberra Group seems to say no gain is income. With several
defensible definitions of income available, arguments should no
longer be about fidelity to a "true" definition of income, but rather
about which better serves underlying objectives.
III. THE COMPREHENSIVE TAX BASE
Definitional arguments were also a key part of the battle between
Bittker of Yale Law School and several other tax scholars in the late
1960's and early 1970's over the proposals to move toward a "compre-
hensive tax base" (CTB). Following Simons and Glenshaw Glass, tax
scholars no longer had any doubt that income is a broad and expan-
sive concept, and commentators and policymakers began advocating
for corresponding reforms to broaden the tax base. The CTB project
also had a goal of eliminating preferences and other kinds of differen-
tial treatment of different items of income, with the hope that broad-
ening the tax base could lead to lower, less distortionary tax rates.
In the midst of this seemingly reasonable project, Bittker wrote an
article in the Harvard Law Review essentially attacking the idea that a
CTB could be a reliable guide to tax reform:
I have concluded that a systematic and rigorous application
of the "no preference" or CTB approach would require
many more sweeping changes in the existing tax structure
than have been acknowledged. I also believe that many of
these changes would be quite unacceptable, despite their
conformity to the Haig-Simons definition, to many of those
who are attracted, in the abstract, by the idea of a CTB. At
the same time, there are in my view many more ambiguities
in the concept than have been acknowledged, and at these
points it sheds less light than some of its supporters seem to
claim.94
Bittker then proceeds systematically through a number of different
areas, arguing that a CTB, or Haig-Simons, approach would require
inclusion of items that no reformer advocates including, and that the
reasons for deviating from a CTB are ultimately practical and politi-
cal, and not based on anything fundamental to the income concept.
93 Id. at 16. Because of the difficulties of translating the stock of net worth into the flow
of income, the Canberra Group instead treats net worth as an additional measure of eco-
nomic wellbeing alongside income and consumption. Id. at 3-4.
94 Bittker, note 18, at 934.
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Examples of items that a CTB approach would treat as "income"
would include government benefits, like transfer programs and Social
Security, life insurance payments, gifts and bequests, support and
dower, imputed income, and even vicarious enjoyment.95 He also
shows that a CTB approach provides little, if any, guidance to funda-
mental questions like the personal/business border, methods of ac-
counting, the taxable unit, timing, and accounting periods.96
Bittker's point was not that these items should be included or not
based on a more consistent use of a CTB definition, but rather that
the definition cannot answer questions that are ultimately about other
things, like administration, fairness, social policy, difficulties of valua-
tion and enforcement, promoting economic growth, and so on:
This means not that all provisions of existing law are equally
good, but rather that we cannot avoid an examination of
each one on its merits in a discouragingly inconclusive pro-
cess that can derive no significant assistance from a no pref-
erence presumption that would at best be applied only on a
wholly selective basis. Put another way, there are prefer-
ences and preferences; some are objectionable, some are tol-
erable, some are unavoidable, and some are indispensable.
A truly "comprehensive" base, in short, would be a
disaster. 97
Bittker's article provoked (in tax scholarship terms) a furious re-
sponse, with strongly-worded articles from important figures of tax
and fiscal theory of the time: Richard Musgrave, 98 Joseph Pechman, 99
and Charles Galvin.100 Bittker responded to these critics, 101 who re-
sponded yet further.102 Musgrave's response is the most trenchant,
and so I review it here briefly.
Musgrave argued that we cannot even talk about income taxation
without some income concept or definition to look to. With that defi-
nition in mind, we can then make decisions about when to follow the
95 Id. at 934-49.
96 Id. at 952-80.
97 Id. at 982.
98 R.A. Musgrave, In Defense of an Income Concept, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 44 (1967).
99 Joseph A. Pechman, Comprehensive Income Taxation: A Comment, 81 Hary. L. Rev.
63 (1967).
100 Charles 0. Galvin, More on Boris Bittker and the Comprehensive Tax Base: The
Practicalities of Tax Reform and the ABA's CSTR, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1016 (1968).
101 Boris I. Bittker, Comprehensive Income Taxation: A Response, 81 Harv. L. Rev.
1032 (1968).
102 The remaining volleys in the debate are compiled in Boris I. Bittker, Charles 0.
Galvin, R.A. Musgrave & Joseph A. Pechman, A Comprehensive Income Tax Base?
(1968).
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definition and when to deviate from it based on issues like feasibility
and equity-we should only deviate from the definition when the
gains from taking a more feasible approach outweigh the equity costs
of not following a purer definition:
In concluding, I believe that Professor Bittker's message is
wrong in both principle and application. His principle-that
matters of income definition should be decided on an ad hoc
basis-is mistaken. A generalized income concept is needed
as an analytical tool if an equitable income tax base is to be
defined. In application, his position-that the income con-
cept is useless because it does not solve all problems and
must be moderated by administrative feasibility-is also in
error. In most situations, the concept points to the equitable
solution, and administratively feasible measures can usually
be found which approximate the proper result to a fair
degree.103
In Bittker's response, he essentially accuses Musgrave of engaging
in exactly the sort of ad hoc judgments that Bittker advocates, and
which Musgrave condemns:
By sedulously qualifying almost every conclusion with such
phrases as ideally, conceptually, and in principle, however,
Musgrave leaves the door open for a quick escape in prac-
tice; and this, coupled with his silence on so many other spe-
cific issues, makes it hard to know how faithfully he would
follow his Platonic, or Hegelian, ideal. One can infer from
Musgrave's scanty affirmative commitments, however, that
he-like other CTB enthusiasts-has a capacious knapsack
of arguments to support a wide range of departures from the
Haig-Simons definition. 1 0 4
He goes on to describe Musgrave's approach as "an insistence that the
Haig-Simons definition will keep us from getting lost in a miasma of
ad hoc judgments, coupled with departures from that definition for
'reasons' that are no more than vague, and sometimes inconsistent,
intuitions."10 5
In a later response, Galvin attempts to mediate the debate-though
perhaps ends up conceding Bittker's point-by analogizing to the de-
bates between Lon Fuller and H.L.A. Hart over legal positivism, say-
103 Musgrave, note 98, at 62.
104 Bittker, note 101, at 1033-34.
105 Id. at 1035.
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ing that the CTB position is analogous to a "natural law" approach to
jurisprudence, as opposed to Bittker's more positivist approach. 106
Bittker, in the concluding piece in the debate, responds that a natural
law-like command to "[f]ollow the Haig-Simons definition unless it
produces adverse results" provides as little guidance as Aquinas's
"[d]o good and avoid evil." 107
For the most part, the debate was not so much about whether there
is a single definition of income-in Bittker's response to Musgrave, he
says, "I do not reject the Haig-Simons definition as 'an analytical
tool'" 10 -but rather whether it should be a policy goal. All parties
seem to agree that there is such a thing as Haig-Simons income, and
furthermore that strictly following that definition would be a mis-
take-they just disagree on how they would characterize its useful-
ness. Bittker argues that a pure Haig-Simons income tax base would
deviate so far from reasonable policy judgments that we should not
even treat it as a guidepost, and instead just make-admittedly con-
tested-judgments case-by-case and item-by-item. 109
In the conclusion of his first piece, however, Bittker seems to go
further and make an argument closer to the argument of this Article,
that part of the problem lies in the fact that there is no single clear
definition of "income" in the first place:
There are many problem areas in which the search for "pref-
erences" is doomed to fail because we cannot confidently say
which provisions are "rules" and which are "exceptions". . . .
The central source of difficulty is the fact that the income tax
structure cannot be discovered, but must be constructed; it is
the final result of a multitude of debatable judgments....
[W]e do not begin with a consensus on the meaning of in-
come, but with a myriad of arguments about what should be
taxed, when, and to whom.110
Here, Bittker's point dovetails with mine. Ultimately, a "con-
structed" definition of income, rather than the "pure" Haig-Simons
definition, is the only possible definition that can both achieve the
goals of the tax system-to assign burdens fairly-and be practically
workable. Furthermore, a constructed definition of income may be
106 Charles 0. Galvin, Epilogue to the Dialogue, in A Comprehensive Income Tax Base,
note 102, at 119.
107 Boris I. Bittker, A Last Word, in A Comprehensive Income Tax Base, note 102, at
126-27.
108 Bittker, note 101, at 1033.
109 See id. at 1041.
110 Bittker, note 18, at 985.
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the only theoretically sound definition, since a pure definition-or at
least one that does not collapse in on itself as Kleinwdchter showed-
remains elusive. Thus, arguments resorting to the Haig-Simons or any
other definition of income do not answer the question, they only re-
phrase it. As Bittker points out, even the CTB proponents support
making practical judgments about particular items based on the typi-
cal policy judgments of equity, efficiency, and administrability. Cloak-
ing these judgments in definitional terms only serves to cut off debate
in areas where it is most necessary.
IV. TAx EXPENDITURES
Where definitional arguments in tax law are perhaps most pro-
nounced are in the area of tax expenditures, which are defined in law
as "revenue losses attributable to provisions of the Federal tax laws
which allow a special exclusion, exemption, or deduction from gross
income or which provide a special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or
a deferral of tax liability.""' Their leading proponent, Stanley Surrey,
described tax expenditures as "special provisions . . . not part of the
structure required for the income tax itself, but . . . instead Govern-
ment expenditures made through the tax system."1 12 As Assistant
Secretary of the Treasury, Surrey pushed for the government to pro-
vide an accounting of tax expenditures-a tax expenditure budget-in
order to shine a light on this form of disguised spending, and, he
hoped, to thereby reign it in. Congress has been required to produce
a tax expenditure budget since 1974.113
The problem with tax expenditures, as Surrey acknowledged, is that
"[t]he use of the phrase 'special provisions' clearly involves a major
definitional question: which tax rules are special provisions and there-
fore tax expenditures, and which tax rules are just tax rules; simply
part of the warp and woof of a tax structure?" 114 This question con-
tinues to go unanswered definitively.
A. Early Debates
Bittker, of course, had problems with Surrey's tax expenditure
methodology, since it requires us to "first construct an ideal or correct
income tax structure, departures from which will be reflected as 'tax
111 Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, § 3(3), 2 U.S.C.
§ 622(3).
112 Stanley S. Surrey, Pathways to Tax Reform: The Concept of Tax Expenditures, at vii
(1973).
113 See 2 U.S.C. § 662(3).
114 Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy:
A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 705, 706 (1970).
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expenditures' in the National Budget." 115 He goes on to recite many
of the same problems he had with the CTB approach-that using
Haig-Simons income as a normative baseline for measuring "special
provisions" means including many more things than anyone might in-
tend, but also provides no guidance on a host of other things that
could be considered tax expenditures depending on the choice of
definition. 116
As a result, any tax expenditure budget must make choices about
what to include and what not to include, and those things not included
may become even more hidden due to their noninclusion in a suppos-
edly neutral accounting of "special provisions."1 1 7 The tax expendi-
ture budget is thus an inherently political document that would
receive the mantle of neutral accounting. As Bittker noted,
For such issues, every man can create his own set of "tax
expenditures," but it will be no more than his collection of
disparities between the income tax law as it is, and as he
thinks it ought to be. Such compilations would be interest-
ing, but I do not know how we can select one of them for
inclusion in the National Budget.118
Ultimately, Bittker still thinks a version of a tax expenditure budget
is a useful thing, and that measuring those expenditures against a
Haig-Simons definition is appropriate. But he resists giving such a
budget any greater normative weight. Calling the tax expenditure
budget a "full accounting" of such deviations would not only be
wrong, but could mean a greater stigmatizing of those items that are
included compared to those items that are not, even if items not in-
cluded have a greater normative effect. For example, a rate reduction
for a high-bracket taxpayer is not categorized as a tax expenditure,
because we have no baseline for judging what is the normatively "cor-
rect" amount of tax for such a person to pay. 119 A tax expenditure
budget risks treating, for example, the Earned Income Tax Credit as
less normatively defensible than such a rate cut. 1 2 0
At this point William Andrews enters the debate to suggest, if not a
resolution to the definitional question, at least a change in the ques-
tion tax expenditure analysis should ask. He first reframes the defini-
115 Boris I. Bittker, Accounting for Federal "Tax Subsidies" in the National Budget, 22
Nat'l Tax J. 244, 248 (1969).
116 Id. at 257-58.
117 Id. at 259.
118 Id. at 260.
119 Id. at 251.
120 Id. at 261.
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tional point, by saying that the issue is not what is and is not income,
but rather by what standard should we apportion the burdens of taxa-
tion. Thus, he argues, "an ideal personal income tax is one in which
tax burdens are accurately apportioned to a taxpayer's aggregate per-
sonal consumption and accumulation of real goods and services and
claims thereto." 121 He thus treats the Haig-Simons definition not as a
sort of accounting identity-which it is-but rather as an independent
normative basis for taxation. The ideal tax, to Andrews, is one that is
based on personal consumption and accumulation, and "income" is a
handy proxy for that.1 22
As Andrews acknowledges, this move resolves little. All we have
done is change the question from what is "income" to what is "con-
sumption" and "accumulation." Simons did not claim those would be
easy questions, however. The main purpose of Simons' definition was
not to resolve for all time what is and is not income, but rather to
demonstrate that issues of source should be irrelevant and that accre-
tions to wealth must be considered. But the shift to "consumption"
and "accumulation" nonetheless still has some use to Andrews:
In relation to these problems the concept of consumption is
not one that enters into Simons' definition of personal in-
come with a simple, fixed, or predetermined meaning. It is
rather a concept calling for creative elaboration to effectuate
the practical implementation of the purposes of the tax....
But Simons' definition indicates the direction in which mean-
ing should be elaborated and where the real problems of tax
policy are to be found.1 23
With the focus now on "consumption," Andrews turns to the issue
of personal deductions in the income tax, and whether some deduc-
tions are inherent to the structure of his ideal income tax, or whether
they are departures that could be considered tax expenditures. He
focuses in particular on medical expenses and charitable contribu-
tions, and argues that in many cases those expenditures should not be
considered "consumption."1 2 4 And if not consumption, then the
121 William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 Harv. L. Rev.
309, 313 (1972).
122 Id. at 328 ("The personal income tax is thus an indirectly measured tax on aggregate
personal consumption and accumulation. Income transactions provide the practical basis
for computing and collecting the tax, but aggregate personal consumption and accumula-
tion are its real objects.").
123 Id. at 324.
124 Id. at 313-16.
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amounts spent on them should not be "income," that is, a deduction is
an appropriate part of an income tax, not a "special provision." 125
A medical purchase is not a form of personal gratification, he ar-
gues, but is rather a reflection of differences in endowments for
health.126 Two people may have the same salary, but if one also has a
chronic illness, that will affect his ability to consume other goods and
services or to accumulate wealth. Thus, the sick person is not "con-
suming" health care-he is simply trying to maintain a baseline of
normal health.
In the case of charitable contributions, if we assume that the donor
derives no benefit, then charitable contributions are just passing con-
sumption through the donor to the donee, and therefore it should be
taxed at the donee's rate, which is likely to be lower than the donor's,
if not zero. 1.27 Disallowing the deduction, Andrews argues, would be
equivalent to taxing the donee at the donor's marginal tax rate. 128
And even if the donor does derive some personal benefit, there are a
number of reasons, Andrews argues, for still excluding charitable con-
tributions from income.129
The focus on "consumption" does not resolve all the issues, how-
ever, and Andrews is clear that these are still judgment calls on which
reasonable people can differ. Simons, for example, argued that chari-
table contributions should not be deductible precisely because they
should be considered "consumption" by the donor, the opposite con-
clusion from Andrews.130 Bittker, in a later article, underscores the
problems with the "consumption" baseline, while still appreciating
Andrews' clarification of the problem. 131
125 See id. at 384-85.
126 Id. at 331-37.
127 Id. at 346.
128 This is assuming that the donor passes through the entire tax benefit. But the degree
to which that is true depends on the price elasticity of charitable contributions, which is an
unsettled issue.
129 In particular, Andrews argues that we do not tax other nontaxable redistributive
actions, such as a businessman paying above-market wages, Andrews, note 121, at 347; we
do not tax the value of services provided to charities, id. (acknowledging that this relates to
overall nontaxation of imputed income, but that taxation of gifts nonetheless would advan-
tage providers of services over providers of cash); and contributions to charities other than
for services to the poor should be considered "common goods" whose benefits are so
spread that taxation based on benefit is practically impossible, id. at 357 et seq.
130 See Simons, note 10, at 57-58 ("If it is not more pleasant to give than to receive, one
may still hesitate to assert that giving is not a form of consumption for the giver. The
proposition that everyone tries to allocate his consumption expenditure among different
goods in such manner as to equalize the utility of dollars-worths may not be highly illumi-
nating; but there is no apparent reason for treating gifts as an exception.").
131 See Boris I. Bittker, Income Tax Deductions, Credits, and Subsidies for Personal
Expenditures, 16 J.L. & Econ. 193, 195-96 & n.7 (1973).
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Andrews is careful not to overstate the work that his definition
does, but by nonetheless couching his arguments for medical expense
and charitable contribution deductions in definitional terms, he cloaks
a policy debate in normative language, about whether such deductions
are "proper" or not. Andrews is still arguing from definitions, just
replacing a definition of "income" with one for "consumption." Per-
haps that is somewhat firmer ground for an argument, but it does not
resolve Kleinwdchter's Conundrums, nor does it point us to the best
policy.
That said, Andrews' choice of a definition is still helpful in re-
minding us that the key question should be whether a tax provision
serves broader normative goals, and not whether it fits into a particu-
lar definition or not. By treating "income" as merely a proxy for over-
all well-being, and not as a normative baseline in its own right, we are
freer to inquire whether a particular deduction or inclusion helps to
measure wellbeing, and not just whether it is "special" or not.
B. The Joint Committee's 2008 Reform Project
In the years since that first burst of tax expenditure literature, other
commentators have worked to try to come up with a more coherent
theory of tax expenditures, but all with only limited success. Victor
Thuronyi, for example, has argued that instead of tax expenditures,
policymakers should look at "substitutable tax provisions," which are
those "whose purposes a non-tax-based federal program can achieve
at least as effectively." 1 3 2 This would focus the analysis in particular
on those tax provisions that could achieve the same goals outside of
the Code. The goal would be de-cluttering the Code of things extra-
neous to it, without resort to definitional arguments about what is in-
herently part of an income tax and what is not.
Daniel Shaviro has argued that tax expenditure analysis should not
hinge on Surrey's distinction between which taxes are "taxes" and
which are actually "spending." 1 3 3 He argues instead that tax rules
should be analyzed under Musgrave's distinction between allocative
and distributional tax rules. 134 Shaviro does not present his version of
tax expenditure analysis with a purpose of removing a particular set of
rules from the Code; instead, he sees it as a key tool for dispassion-
ately analyzing tax rules on their own merits. "There is no necessary
implication that tax expenditures must be eliminated," he writes,
"only that we should think about them differently than the usual 'tax'
132 Victor Thuronyi, Tax Expenditures: A Reassessment, 1988 Duke L.J. 1155, 1156.
133 Daniel N. Shaviro, Rethinking Tax Expenditures and Fiscal Language, 57 Tax L. Rev.
187, 188 (2004).
134 Id.
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and 'spending' categories imply."1 35 He then goes on to propose
changes to the tax expenditure budget that would place it on firmer
ground while minimizing contestable political judgments.136
David Weisbach and Jacob Nussim take a similar approach of trying
to separate policy judgments from tax expenditure analysis. 37 Instead
of looking at the tax expenditure question from the perspective of tax
policy, they argue, we should be looking at it from the perspective of
institutional design. That is, the question should just be how best for
the government to implement a particular policy and which agency is
best equipped to do so. They compare having the IRS run national
defense and implement the Earned Income Tax Credit: While the
first task may not be appropriate for reasons of institutional expertise
and specialization, the second may well be, even though the IRS is
primarily a taxing agency not a welfare agency, because of its exper-
tise in tasks such as income measurement.138 Like Shaviro, they argue
that the heated definitional battles and implicit condemnation of tax
expenditures that arise from Surrey's approach do harm to the analyt-
ical usefulness that a "nonevaluative" tax expenditure budget could
provide.139
While these reframings are worthwhile and would help to place tax
expenditure analysis on more solid theoretical ground, they are funda-
mentally different projects than one that seeks to determine what fac-
tors ought normatively to be the basis of taxation. Tax expenditure
analysis, as Surrey conceived of it, is partly an act of tax gatekeep-
ing-keep what is tax within the Code and keeping what is not, out-
but it also fundamentally normative and distributional, in the sense
that tax expenditures go above and beyond the justifications for tax
qua tax, and in many cases actively undermine them. None of these
other approaches would tell us whether such spending is a good idea
or not; they would only tell us something about the choice to do it
through the tax system or not.
Thus, there continues to be a theoretical vacuum around tax ex-
penditures just as Bittker first diagnosed in 1969 and which Andrews
attempted, with mixed success, to fill in 1972. We still have little other
135 Id. at 221.
136 Id. at 228-31.
137 David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending Programs,
113 Yale L.J. 955 (2004).
138 Id. at 958-59. Nussim & Weisbach say that from an institutional design perspective,
the definition of income is irrelevant to which agency does the work. Id. at 975. This
neglects the fact highlighted by this Article that different agencies measure income in dif-
ferent ways. See notes 185-210 and accompanying text. Of course, nothing prevents one
agency from using another's definition, but there appears to be great temptation to turn
income measurement tasks over to the IRS and its definition.
139 Weisbach & Nussim, note 137, at 976-77.
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than contested political judgments to determine what items should, or
should not, be included in income, and what deductions should, or
should not, be allowed.
In 2008, the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) attempted to fill
that vacuum. As one of the bodies charged with tax expenditure anal-
ysis, the JCT annually produces a tax expenditure budget, along with
front matter explaining the approach and what it has decided to treat
as tax expenditures. 140 In Reconsidering Tax Expenditure Analysis,
the JCT acknowledged that tax expenditure analysis had largely failed
in its project of eliminating the use of tax expenditures by Congress,
and it placed some of that blame on "insufficiently rigorous founda-
tions" of the analysis. 141
Tax expenditure methodology requires the JCT to specify a "nor-
mal" tax baseline, and then to treat as a tax expenditure any provision
that deviates from that baseline. But, as discussed at length above,
there is no pure "normal" tax. As the JCT staff wrote,
[T]he "normal" tax is largely a commonsense extension (and
cleansing) of current tax policies, not a rigorous tax frame-
work developed from first principles. As a result, the "nor-
mal" tax cannot be defended from criticism as a series of
ultimately idiosyncratic or pragmatic choices. If tax expendi-
ture analysis is to enjoy broad support, it must be seen as
neutral and principled; unfortunately, the "normal" tax satis-
fies these requirements only in the eyes of those who already
believe that the "normal" tax accurately captures their per-
sonal ideal of a tax system.1 4 2
To try to place tax expenditure analysis on firmer footing, the JCT
introduced a new methodology that, it claimed, would not rely on con-
tested normative judgments about what the "normal" tax baseline
should be. It thus defined two categories of tax expenditures, "Tax
Subsidies" and "Tax-Induced Structural Distortions." 143 It defined
Tax Subsidies as "a specific tax provision that is deliberately inconsis-
tent with an identifiable general rule of the present tax law (not a
hypothetical 'normal' tax), and that collects less revenue than does the
general rule." 144 Tax-Induced Structural Distortions were "structural
elements of the Internal Revenue Code (not deviations from any
140 See, e.g., Staff of Joint Comm. on Tax'n, Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for
Fiscal Years 2016-2020 (2017), https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=select&id=5.
141 Joint Comm. on Tax'n, note 19, at 7.
142 Id. at 36.
143 Id. at 39.
144 Id.
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clearly identifiable general tax rule and thus not Tax Subsidies in our
classification) that materially affect economic decisions in a manner
that imposes substantial efficiency costs." 14 5
That second category was needed, JCT decided, because some of
what were commonly' considered tax expenditures did not neatly fit
into the newly-defined Tax Subsidy category. Provisions such as the
ability to defer U.S. taxation on the active income of controlled for-
eign corporations, for example, or the different tax treatment of debt
and equity, could not be judged against some "clearly identifiable
rule," because there is no clear consensus on what the general rule of
law is or should be.1 4 6 Traditional tax expenditure analysis would just
say, for example, that a "normal" tax would include taxation of world-
wide income, and thus deferral of foreign earnings would be a "special
provision," a deviation from true worldwide taxation. 147 The new JCT
methodology did not say that the provision was "special" in the sense
of deviating from the pure tax baseline, but rather that its existence
generated a lot of tax-motivated structuring and planning, and thus
should be eliminated in the name of evening the playing field and re-
ducing tax gaming.148
The ostensible goal of JCT's new methodology was to switch from
the supposedly "normative" Haig-Simons baseline to a nonnormative,
more practical and real-world baseline, with a hope to sidestep the
Bittker-like criticism about the rigor of tax expenditure analysis. That
new baseline has been described as more like a current law reference
baseline, similar to what the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) uses
in making fiscal projections or to what Treasury uses in its alternative
tax expenditure budgets. 149
Some commentators criticized this move as simply incorporating a
normatively worse baseline-entrenching current law rather than
striving for a more ideal law.150 But if we accept my argument that all
income definitions are a set of choices, the new methodology is prob-
lematic not because it accepts a second-best income definition, but
rather because it purported to be free from definitional problems
altogether.
The stated goal of the new methodology was to provide "neutral
and principled" standards by which to measure tax expenditures, with-
145 Id. at 41.
146 Id. at 41-42.
147 Id. at 10.
148 Id. at 41-42.
149 J. Clifton Fleming & Robert J. Peroni, Can Tax Expenditure Analysis Be Divorced
from a Normative Tax Base?: A Critique of the "New Paradigm" and Its Denouement, 30
Va. Tax. Rev. 135, 155 (2010).
150 Id.
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out the fraught debates around what is "income." But those debates
are inescapable as long as some baseline is used. The choice of base-
line affects the number and magnitude of the tax expenditures, and
since "tax expenditure" was intended to be a pejorative term,151 the
degree of approbation is directly related to the choice of baseline.
JCT might have declared that the baseline was not intended to be a
normative objective, but the tax expenditure budget still puts a cost-
a value-laden measure-on the degree of deviation from that
baseline.
Furthermore, the new methodology may not have provided any
clarity. In the tax expenditure budget that applied the new methodol-
ogy, little changed from the pre-2008 tax expenditure analysis. All of
the pre-2008 tax expenditures were still considered tax expenditures in
the 2008 tax expenditure budget. 152 They just were slotted into new
categories. Indeed, while no provisions left the tax expenditure
budget entirely, only five were moved into the new Tax-Induced
Structural Distortions category; the vast majority retained the more
quasi-normative label of "Tax Subsidy."153
In the end, the new approach did not take. After using the new
methodology for one tax expenditure budget, in 2008, the Joint Com-
mittee Staff returned to its prior methodology in 2010. The JCT staff
said that the similarity between the new and old approach, the fact
that the old approach was somewhat more expansive, and historical
continuity convinced it to return to the pre-2008 approach, which it
has maintained through the current period.1 54
The 2008-era JCT staff deserves credit for at least openly acknowl-
edging the theoretical limits of tax expenditure analysis. Their work
was correctly premised on the idea that there is no such thing as an
exogenous, pure, yet measurable, Haig-Simons income tax-that even
a baseline has to be constructed through practical and political
choices. However, the project ultimately failed because it attempted
to sidestep those issues, to be a mere passive and neutral observer.
But the issues are unavoidable. The tax expenditure budget is pre-
mised on the idea that some tax provisions have a "cost" to the fisc
and others do not, and that cost is due to a deviation from some pre-
ferred baseline. Because there is no truly "pure" income baseline, the
151 See, e.g., Bruce Bartlett, The End of Tax Expenditures as We Know Them?, 92 Tax
Notes 413, 414 (July 16, 2001); Shaviro, note 133, at 201 (the tax expenditure budget was
intended as a "hit list").
152 Staff Joint Comm. on Tax'n, note 19, at 47.
153 Cf. Staff Joint Comm. on Tax'n, Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditure for Fiscal
Years 2008-2012, at 69 (2008), https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=select&id=5.
154 Staff Joint Comm. on Tax'n, Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years
2009-2013 (2010), https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=select&id=5.
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baseline is no less constructed than the tax base itself. The construc-
tion of that base is a fundamentally political question, one that ana-
lysts and scholars must lean into instead of avoiding.
V. OPTIMAL INCOME TAX THEORY
The discussion thus far briefly lays out some of the classic debates in
the legal literature over the definition of income, and how the un-
resolvable nature of the question leads some commentators into theo-
retical dead ends. But the claim of this Article is not just that the
question cannot be answered rigorously, but also that in our attempts
to construct a practical definition of income, we necessarily incorpo-
rate policy and normative judgments into the definition. This is una-
voidable, but the danger is that those judgments get swallowed up and
hidden when we simply say that such-and-such is, or is not, "income."
By naming the thing "income," and giving it the special normative
weight that "income" gets, we hide the myriad decisions that go into
constructing "income." This is particularly a problem when two peo-
ple both talk about "income," but are referring to different things. As
an example, I consider here the role of optimal income tax theory in
tax policy, and in tax theory more generally.
Optimal income tax theory is a branch of public finance economics
that unlike many branches of economics is explicitly normative. 155
The basic question is, what tax system will maximize social welfare,
where social welfare is represented by some function that often incor-
porates normative objectives, such as minimizing income inequality,
or insuring a minimum level of resources for the lowest income
groups.156
This is, obviously, a difficult question to get traction on. The insight
of a principal founder of optimal income tax theory, James Mirrlees,
was to treat the problem essentially as one of asymmetric informa-
tion-how should the government pick a tax schedule to maximize
social welfare without knowing a priori each person's propensity to
earn income and how taxation might affect it?157 The original Mir-
rlees paper is dense and mathematically formal. It uses a control-the-
oretic construct whereby individuals with identical utility functions
but different ability types choose income and consumption bundles,
155 See, e.g., Robin Boadway, From Optimal Tax Theory to Tax Policy: Retrospective
and Prospective Views 1-2 (2012) (optimal tax scholars "formulate models of optimal tax-
transfer systems based on normative principles that reflect efficiency and equity
considerations").
156 Though often the social welfare function is strictly utilitarian, that is, just a summa-
tion of individual utilities.
157 Mirrlees, note 20, at 175.
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given their abilities and some tax schedule.158 By application of the
revelation principle, the social planner can pick the tax schedule that
induces everyone to reveal their type-that is, to earn actual income
in the same rank order as their abilities to earn income. 159
In the Mirrlees set-up, as interpreted and simplified by others, abil-
ity is represented by a personal wage rate, w, 1 6 0 while income is repre-
sented by the person's wage rate times effort, or wl. In the simple
case, we could think of that as an hourly wage rate times hours
worked. All the social planner can see is wl, not w alone. The social
planner wants to find the right mix of revenue raised-which is then
redistributed to meet its normative goals without causing high-ability
taxpayers to mimic low-ability taxpayers in order to lower their tax
burden. They could do this by, for example, substituting from labor
toward leisure, taking a lower-paying job, or simply hiding income.
Too much of that behavior means less taxable income, which means
less revenue, which means less redistribution and therefore lower so-
cial welfare. The social planner picks a rate schedule to maximize so-
cial welfare giving these two competing forces, and specifically one
that induces the individuals to reveal their type through their choice of
income and consumption bundles.
The original Mirrlees paper (and those that followed) contained
some surprising results, most notably that the optimal marginal rate
schedule might follow an inverted U-shape and actually decline at
high income levels, 161 perhaps becoming 0% for the highest earner
under some assumptions. 162 The logic of that result, in the model, is
that a government can collect more revenue, and thus redistribute
more, if it makes mimicking a low-ability individual less attractive to
high-ability individuals; it ought to encourage them to move up a tax
bracket, rather than down, essentially.
The original Mirrlees paper is very stylized, and uses a "parsimoni-
ous" 1 6 3 model that, assumes, among other things, that the only differ-
ences between individuals are their abilities and that individuals have
158 Formally, Mirrlees describes this as the government choosing a consumption bundle
for the individual, since the degree of taxation determines how much income is available
for consumption. Id. at 177; see also Boadway, note 155, at 12 n.6; Kaplow, note 23, at 65.
159 See Kaplow, note 23, at 65-66, 66 n.20; Mankiw et al., note 56, at 150.
160 See, e.g., Boadway, note 155, at 60; Kaplow, note 23, at 54 ("In standard formula-
tions of the optimal income tax problem, individuals' abilities are indicated by their given
wage rate, taken to be exogenous.").
161 See Boadway, note 155, at 13; Mankiw et al., note 56, at 151-55; Mirrlees, note 20, at
202-04.
162 See Mankiw et al., note 56, at 151-52; Mirrlees, note 20, at 195; J.K. Seade, On the
Shape of Optimal Tax Schedules, 7 J. Pub. Econ. 203 (1977).
163 Boadway, note 155, at 13. Mirrlees clearly spells out some of his many assumptions
at the outset. Mirrlees, note 20, at 175-76. He also urges caution in interpreting his results.
Id. at 207-08.
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identical utility functions that depend just on consumption and leisure.
The paper is over forty years old, and the optimal tax literature since
then is vast and complex. It is not my intent here to recite the nuances
and results of later, more developed work, of which there are many.
Rather, I want to discuss how the literature defines "income" in a par-
ticular way that does not line up with the definitions discussed earlier
in this paper, and how that definition derives from both the particular
policy concerns and methodological constraints of economics. As a
result, commentators and policymakers need to be careful about im-
porting the results of the optimal income tax literature, since the "in-
come" tax that it purports to study may be quite different from the
"income" tax under discussion.
First, and most importantly, the basic definition of income that just
about any optimal tax paper starts with is the definition above-wl, an
individual's wage rate times effort.164 At its most basic, that is simply a
measure of cash labor earnings, though it would presumably also en-
compass fringe benefits and other noncash earnings. Note how far
that is from the idea of gain or accessions to wealth that is at the heart
of the Haig-Simons definition, however. It does not include any capi-
tal income, for example, much less the imputed income from housing
and other consumer durables.
There are several reasons for using this particular definition of in-
come, rather than something broader like Haig-Simons. First, the def-
inition follows from the set-up and objective of the Mirrlees model-
namely, that the social planner wants to redistribute but does not want
to create excessive disincentives to earn labor income-the classic la-
bor-leisure distortion-such that a person's income no longer reflects
their ability. Because minimizing the effect of the labor-leisure mar-
gin is the particular concern and task for the social planner, labor in-
come and labor effort are the objects of study. The income definition
is thus directly related to the particular policy objective.
Second, the social planner's objectives in the model are driven as
much or more by mathematical tractability as true social policy. The
social planner's goal in optimal income tax theory is sometimes de-
scribed as an independent desire to tax ability. Importantly, Mirrlees
did not make a tax on ability an independent objective; his goal was
maximizing social welfare. But in the literature, this objective is
164 See, e.g., Boadway, note 155, at 52, 60; Kaplow, note 23, at 53-54; Atkinson & Stig-
litz, note 22, at 57; James A. Mirrlees, The Theory of Optimal Taxation, in 3 Handbook of
Mathematical Economics 1197, 1202 (Kenneth J. Arrow & Michael D. Intriligator eds.,
1986); Nicholas Stern, Optimum Taxation with Errors in Administration, 17 J. Pub. Econ.
181, 185 (1982); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Self-Selection and Pareto Efficient Taxation, 17 J. Pub.
Econ. 213, 2146 (1982).
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sometimes collapsed down into a first-order desire to tax ability. 165
Beginning especially with a paper by George Aklerlofl 66 this led to a
literature on "tagging," that is, searching for nonincome-based indica-
tors of a person's type. 167 If a tax included tags for ability, it would
lower the incentives for a high-ability person to mimic a low-ability
person by earning less income-the tags would reveal this mimicry,
and the social planner could still tax accordingly.
But let's be clear-while taxing "ability" may be nondistortive, it is
normatively deeply flawed.s68 No government would truly have that
as a first-best policy. It implies, for example, that high-ability Ivy
League graduates should all be taxed as if they are law partners,
hedge fund managers, TV show-runners, or tech entrepreneurs (or at
least average ones, if we include luck as a factor), even if they start
nonprofits, teach public school, or become monks.1 69 And presuma-
bly vice versa, though I have not seen this point in the literature-a
lucky, low-ability individual who wins the lottery would pay no more
in tax than he would have if he had lost.1 70
The set-up is thus driven not by a true social or normative objective,
but rather by a need to create a simplified, mathematically tractable,
version of the information problems faced by a government using a
distortive tax instrument. The ability/income divide is in effect a sim-
plified metaphor for the information and distortion problems of in-
come taxes. This is not to say that the insights of the literature are not
useful-they are extremely valuable, especially for isolating the theo-
retical effects of particular tax instruments, and for underscoring some
165 See, e.g., Atkinson & Stiglitz, note 22, at 56; Mankiw et al., note 56, at 150; Stiglitz,
note 164, at 214 ("The government would like to differentiate between low ability and high
ability individuals. If it could identify them costlessly, it would impose differential lump-
sum taxes. It can, however, only observe differences in earned income.").
166 George A. Akerlof, The Economics of "Tagging" as Applied to the Optimal Income
Tax, Welfare Programs, and Manpower Planning, 68 Am. Econ. Rev. 8 (1978).
167 See, e.g., Boadway, note 155, at 169-74 (discussing literature); Kaplow, note 23, at 96-
103 (discussing literature); Mankiw et al., note 56, at 161-66.
168 A full articulation of the liberty and other objections is beyond the scope of this
article. For more discussion see, e.g., David Hasen, Liberalism and Ability Taxation, 85
Tex. L. Rev. 1057 (2006); Daniel Shaviro, Endowment and Inequality, in Tax Justice: The
Ongoing Debate 123 (Joseph J. Thorndike & Dennis J. Ventry Jr. eds., 2002); Kirk J. Stark,
Enslaving the Beachcomber: Some Thoughts on the Liberty Objections to Endowment
Taxation, 18 Can. J.L. & Juris. 47 (2005); Linda Sugin, A Philosophical Objection to the
Optimal Tax Model, 64 Tax L. Rev. 229, 237 (2011); Lawrence Zelenak, Taxing Endow-
ment, 55 Duke L.J. 1145 (2006).
169 This is sometimes described as the "high-ability beachcomber" problem. See, e.g.,
Stark, note 168.
170 An easy extension of an optimal tax model would be to allow lump-sum taxation of
windfalls such as this, since that would be nondistortive. But that is a different policy than
taxing ability-that would be a policy of using lots of nondistortive tax instruments, which
just underscores that the point is distortion and social welfare, not that taxing ability is the
normative objective.
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key questions and assumptions that should guide tax design. But ulti-
mately, optimal tax theory provides little guidance about what an in-
come tax actually is or should be.
This stylized set-up and relatively narrow definition of income can
lead commentators to misinterpret some of the results of the litera-
ture, especially when imported to our more real-world income tax.
Here, I highlight two possible ways that the literature can be
misinterpreted.
First, while the income definition used in the optimal tax literature
can be described as labor earnings, a seemingly unambiguous mea-
sure, it is not free from the sort of definitional ambiguity that arose in
the CTB and tax expenditure debates. To see this, consider the way
that the literature models utility.
In the typical optimal tax set-up, the social welfare function is some
weighted combination of individual utility functions, and individual
utility is usually some function of consumption and leisure.171 Con-
sumption is done out of after-tax income, while leisure is just leisure.
Potential distortions arise because consumption is taxed while leisure
is not, making leisure somewhat more attractive than it would be in
the absence of taxation. But, as noted in the earlier discussion,172 lei-
sure is a form of consumption as well, and encompasses more than just
sitting around. "Leisure" here is just a catch-all category for any form
of untaxed consumption.
Similarly, in considering the labor/leisure margin and applying the
Haig-Simons identity, leisure could be thought of as any form of un-
taxed economic income, including capital income, black-market in-
come, psychic income, imputed services, as so on. In other words, the
labor/leisure choice is not really between working and not working,
but rather between taxed forms of consumption and income and un-
taxed forms of consumption and income.
Therefore, what is "labor" and what is "leisure" is entirely a func-
tion of the tax itself, and in particular the choice about how to define
the tax base. "Labor" and "leisure" do not exist prior to policy
choices about what to tax but actually follow from those choices. As a
result, using a seemingly more clearly specified and limited definition
of income still does not free optimal tax theory from the definitional
problems discussed herein. Choices still need to be made, and many
of those will be choices about how to build the model ex ante, not in
interpreting its results ex post. If "income" in the optimal tax models
included more of the items now considered "leisure"-like imputed
171 See, e.g., Kaplow, note 23, at 55; Atkinson & Stiglitz, note 22, at 59; Mirrlees, note
20, at 177.
172 See notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
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services-presumably we would see fewer, or at least different,
distortions.
Second, the focus on utility from consumption, and the definition of
income as labor earnings, also leads to one of the more famous and
controversial results of the literature, the Atkinson-Stiglitz result. At-
kinson & Stiglitz show, under certain strong assumptions, that when a
government has available a nonlinear income tax, it is best for any
commodity taxes to be uniform-to have the same, rather than differ-
ent, tax rates on all goods.173 One not very controversial implication
of this result is that governments ought to use a single-rate VAT or
sales tax, rather than, for example, a low or zero rate for food and a
high rate for luxuries. It is better instead to handle any distributional
issues using the income tax.174
A more controversial interpretation, however, is that governments
should not impose capital income taxes.175 In other words, one could
interpret the optimal tax literature as not just passively choosing to tax
only labor income because of the structure of the basic model, but
affirmatively instructing governments to only tax labor income. 176 At-
kinson-Stiglitz is interpreted in this way because a tax on capital is, in
some ways, an extra tax on future consumption relative to current
consumption. Invested capital is generally after-labor-income-tax
capital, and so a person is deciding between consuming that after-tax
income today or investing it to earn a return to fund future consump-
tion. If the person expects to earn a normal risk-adjusted market re-
turn, but is taxed again on that return in the form of a capital income
tax, then her future purchasing power will be less than her current
purchasing power in present value. In Atkinson-Stiglitz terms, this
functions as differential taxation of two commodities-current com-
modity X and future commodity X-which their model implies is a
bad idea.
The Atkinson-Stiglitz result has had an enormous effect on tax
scholarship and policy, and many commentators take it as at least a
173 See Atkinson & Stiglitz, note 22, at 68.
174 This is sometimes referred to as a "double-distortion" issue. An income tax creates a
distortion by taxing labor. A differential commodity tax also has that distortion (since
work is somewhat less valuable if you are able to consume less from an hour of work), but
also introduces a distortion between commodities. Even if you wanted individuals who
buy luxury items to pay more taxes, you could accomplish that with less distortion using an
income tax.
175 See, e.g., Boadway, note 155, at 96-101 (discussing this interpretation of Atkinson-
Stiglitz); Kaplow, note 23, at 221-23 (same); Joseph Bankman & David A Weisbach, The
Superiority of an Ideal Consumption Tax Over an Ideal Income Tax, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1413
(2005).
176 See Boadway, note 155, at 96-97; Kaplow, note 23, at 222-24; Atkinson & Stiglitz,
note 22, at 69.
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starting point in any discussion of capital income taxes. It has led
even some scholars who support significant redistribution to at times
also support a consumption tax over an income tax (since the taxation
of capital is the essential difference between the two).1 77
The obvious criticism of the Atkinson-Stiglitz result is that it is built
on a highly stylized model, with many heroic assumptions about indi-
viduals, utility, social welfare, and the rest. (And much of the work
since 1976 involves relaxing these assumptions, with different results.)
But even taken on its own terms, we should be careful about inter-
preting the result too broadly. First, the question is not whether capi-
tal income is income or not. Indeed, unlike in the Mirrlees set-up, we
are now at least acknowledging that there is more to income than la-
bor earnings. Rather, the question is whether and under what circum-
stances capital income can be taxed without a net loss to social
welfare. The Atkinson-Stiglitz result is thus best thought of not as a
final answer, but rather as "an organizing device for highlighting devi-
ations from [the result]." 178
Moreover, because it grows out of the Mirrlees framework, the At-
kinson-Stiglitz result is driven by the same underlying policy con-
cerns-maximizing social welfare that is a function of individuals'
consumption and leisure. If all that really matters to utility is con-
sumption, and if individuals are indifferent between present and dis-
counted future consumption, then it is not that surprising that the
resulting welfare-maximizing tax system would treat present and fu-
ture consumption the same. But, again, that means we have a defini-
tion of income that grows out of the framing of the policy goal, namely
to maximize utility from consumption. Again, the definition of in-
come reflects underlying policy choices rather than determines them.
We could imagine a very different set of policy concerns. For exam-
ple, maybe accumulation of assets provides utility separate from its
ability to fund future consumption; or excessive concentration of
wealth impedes social welfare for a whole set of reasons difficult to
model; or we have a glut of savings and actually want to encourage
current consumption over future consumption; or capital income, in a
low-interest-rate environment, actually reflects not time-value returns
but a combination of luck, market power, and disguised labor income,
all of which Atkinson-Stiglitz would happily tax. Ultimately, the pol-
icy choices embedded in the model are what end up determining the
tax base, rather than vice versa.
177 See, e.g., Bankman & Weisbach, note 175; Edward J. McCaffery & James R. Hines
Jr, The Last Best Hope for Progressivity in Tax, 83 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1031 (2010); Daniel N.
Shaviro, Replacing the Income Tax with a Progressive Consumption Tax, 103 Tax Notes 91
(Apr. 5, 2004).
178 See Boadway, note 155, at 59.
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To summarize, this discussion is not intended as an indictment of
the optimal tax literature, which I think is important and valuable.
Rather, the point is that scholars, commentators, and policymakers
should understand that when the optimal tax literature speaks about
"income" and "income taxes," it may be talking about something very
different from what the reader imagines. Moreover, those particular
definitions of income embody and reflect policy choices that may also
be different from those of the reader. We must remember that in-
come-even in economics-is not a pure concept, but is rather a con-
structed idea based on political and practical objectives.
VI. INCOME BEYOND TAXATION
The discussion thus far has focused on definitions of income for tax
purposes, and the theoretical issues they raise. In this Part, I expand
the discussion beyond just tax by considering the role that "income"
plays as a broader metric of comparison between individuals-for
both tax and nontax purposes. I begin by laying out the issues that
can arise when tax-driven measures of income are imported to nontax
areas. I then turn to a detailed analysis and breakdown of the many
definitions of income that are used by different agencies for different
purposes.
A. The Index of Equality
Problems with the income concept have effects beyond just tax law
and scholarship. As Musgrave argued in 1959, the choice of a tax base
is not simply an administrative choice, but also establishes that base as
an "index of equality,"17 9 a metric for making comparisons between
individuals. That normative index is particularly important for taxa-
tion, since at its core a system of taxation has to make normative deci-
sions about the relative demands it puts on individuals to fund public
and collective goods. But that normative index can then seep out into
other areas of law and policy. 180
Income has thus become generalized as the way to make normative
comparisons. We talk about high- and low-income individuals, in-
come inequality, income disparities between men and women, be-
tween whites and minorities, and so on. Many studies of course also
look at other metrics for comparison, like wealth, health, educational
outcomes, and the like, but income is the dominant comparison-de-
179 Musgrave, note 43, at 161-73.
180 See Thuronyi, note 46, at 45 (noting that concepts of income and income distribution,
as measured for the purposes of tax policy, also impact other areas of public policy as well
as the social sciences).
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spite the fact that one hundred years ago theorists and courts were not
even sure what income was, and as I have argued here any pure defi-
nition remains elusive.
The corollary to using income as the index for making normative
comparisons is that only those items included in the income definition
are used for such comparisons, whereas items not included are not.
The nonincluded items might still reflect important margins of ine-
quality, however. But if they are not in the index, those margins
might be ignored.
For example, consider the example that began this Article-net im-
puted income for owner-occupied housing. That is a significant form
of income, in a Haig-Simons sense-for many people, it could amount
to thousands or tens of thousands of dollars a year. That is enough to
affect a horizontal equity comparison between individuals. Two peo-
ple with the same salary, but one owning a home and the other paying
rent (and holding all else equal), should not be thought of as having
equal economic wellbeing. Understanding this, many means-tested
programs include assets, not just income, in their formulas. But the
vast majority of other definitions of income-tax and otherwise-do
not.
As another example, consider capital gains. As Simons taught us,
accretions to wealth ought to be considered when comparing individu-
als. But the tax system does not measure increases or decreases in
wealth. All that it measures are realized capital gains or business
profits-under our realization-based tax system, increases in the value
of property do not become taxable until they are "realized" through a
sale or exchange. Thus, an individual who simply buys and holds
could see her wealth grow year after year, without ever having that
growth appear as "income." 181 Furthermore, many of the other defi-
nitions of income discussed in the next Section do not include even
realized gain.
The failure to measure unrealized gains in AGI means that the tax
data likely understates the income of the highest-income cohort, since
we observe only realized, but not unrealized, gains. 182 This absence
might be even worse in studies that use income definitions that do not
include realized gains either, like the Bureau of Economic Analysis's
181 Indeed, if the person holds the property until death, none of the growth will ever be
income to anyone, since § 1014 steps up the basis of property transferred by bequest or
inheritance, thus wiping out any built-in gain in the property.
182 This is exacerbated by the fact that well-advised taxpayers will annually realize most
or all of their portfolio losses.
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Personal Income measure.183 Trying to accurately measure the in-
come from capital is thus a major methodological problem for tax and
other researchers. In many studies about income inequality, capital
gains are simply left out altogether. 184 Much of the work that Thomas
Piketty does in Capital in the Twenty-First Century (and in earlier
work with co-authors) is an attempt to construct some measures of
capital and the income from capital from the relatively thin sources
available, relying especially on tax data for the wealthiest cohort.18 5
His work is probably the most comprehensive ever done in that re-
spect, but has still faced some strong and fair criticisms. He has also
said that his desire to have a global wealth tax is driven as much, if not
more, by a desire for data than about any normative benefits. 186
To be clear, I am not saying that any definition has necessarily failed
by not taxing these two items of Haig-Simons income-imputed in-
come from housing and unrealized capital gains. It should be clear by
now that I am skeptical of definitional arguments. My point is rather
that if they are not included in the definition of income, they are not
used as a basis for comparisons between individuals, for tax and non-
tax purposes. If income is our normative index of equality, then only
those things that are "income" are used as a basis for comparison.
A possible response is that what a tax system cares about, ulti-
mately, is cash. Cash is what the government needs to pay its obliga-
tions, and thus we should tax people on their ability to pay that
cash.' 7 (Other income definitions, like the Census Bureau's Money
Income concept, explicitly make the choice to focus on cash.188) That
183 Mark Ledbetter, Bureau of Econ. Analysis, Comparison of BEA Estimates of Per-
sonal Income and IRS Estimates of Adjusted Gross Income (2007), https://www.bea.gov/
scb/pdf/2007/11 %2ONovember/1107_pi-agi.pdf.
184 See, e.g., notes 226, 235, and accompanying text.
185 Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century 11, 17-19 (Arthur Goldhammer
trans., 2014). This is partly because other measures do not include capital gain, and partly
because other data sources are top-coded for high-income people, meaning that tax returns
might be the only source of good data.
186 See, e.g., Matthew Yglesias, Thomas Piketty Doesn't Hate Capitalism, He Just Wants
to Fix It: Interview, Vox (Apr. 24, 2014), http://www.vox.com/2014/4/24/5643780/who-is-
thomas-piketty#interview ("To me, one of the main purposes of the wealth tax is that it
should produce more information on wealth. I think even a wealth tax with a minimal tax
rate would be a way toward more financial transparency. A minimal registration tax on
assets, a minimum wealth tax is a way that we can produce more information on wealth,
and then we'll see what happens in terms of tax rate.").
187 See e.g., Joseph M. Dodge, Deconstructing the Haig-Simons Income Tax and Recon-
structing It as Objective Ability-to-Pay "Cash Income" (Fla St. Pub. Law, Research Paper
No. 633, 2013), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2 245 8 18 . Dodge's
"cash income" concept is much more nuanced than can be given justice here, though he
proposes changes that move the income concept more toward cash, such as repealing ac-
crual accounting and depreciation, and embedding the realization principle. Id. at 1-2.
188 Arnold J. Katz, Explaining Long-Term Differences Between Census and BEA Mea-
sures of Household Income 2 n.1 (Jan. 10, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (available at
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could do away with the problems of imputed income and unrealized
gains, for example. A senior on a fixed income living in a house he
owns may not be liquid enough to pay a higher tax, nor would a small
business owner whose capital is all tied up in the business.
These are, essentially, the practical judgments we have already
made with respect to imputed rent and unrealized gains. But we
should remember that the tax system makes many huge deviations
from a notion of cash income already. To list just a few: accrual ac-
counting, cost recovery, pass-through taxation for partnerships and S
corporations, constructive sales rules, the tax treatment of borrowing,
original issue discount, constructive receipt of deferred compensation,
passive loss limitations, casualty loss limitations, § 475 mark-to-mar-
ket treatment, subpart F, and so on. In these and other areas, Con-
gress has decided that a taxpayer should pay taxes based on a broader
idea of economic income than simply available cash.
If taxable income were just cash income, we might be less inclined
to give greater normative weight to AGI-it would be more obviously
just an accounting category. But because the tax system purports to
measure "all income from whatever source derived," AGI takes on
the appearance of comprehensiveness, which in turn makes it appear
appropriate for nontax comparisons as well.
As discussed in the next Section, the tax definition of income is not
the only one out there. Other agencies use surveys or other adminis-
trative data to come up with their own measures of income. While
these definitions do not necessarily replicate the choices of the tax
system, they make their own choices for their own particular policy or
other reasons. I discuss these more below. But the tax definition of
income is still the central concept. The other measures all rely on tax
administrative data to some extent, and several of them are explicitly
keyed off of AGI.189 These measures start with income as reported on
tax returns, and then make adjustments to better capture whatever the
particular agency decides should be included. AGI thus has a long
reach. As a result, legislative changes to the Code for tax reasons can
have repercussions beyond just tax, affecting income measures used
for transfers or for other policy analysis. For example, moving an
itemized deduction, such as for charitable contributions, "above the
line" (that is, used in calculating AGI) could affect an individual's eli-
gibility for subsidized health insurance or student loan forgiveness.
Musgrave's prediction has thus come true, in two ways. First, in-
come has become the dominant metric by which to make comparisons
https://www.bea.gov/papers/pdf/arnold-katz-fcsm-paper.pdf). See also notes 202-03 and
accompanying text.
189 See notes 220-21 and accompanying text.
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among individuals-it is the primary "index of equality." One cannot
prove the counterfactual, of course, but if the tax system had chosen a
different measure of ability to pay-consumption or wealth, for exam-
ple-we might have a different normative language today.
Second, although income does not have a single definition, and can
in fact be defined in a nearly infinite number of ways, the tax system's
definition of income-a definition driven almost entirely by tax pol-
icy-extends into nontax areas, and especially into other normative
spaces, like eligibility for transfers and a broader measurement of ine-
quality. As argued above, any definition of income is a policy choice,
but the tax system's dominance in income measurement means that
some tax policy choices are imported into other areas where they may
not belong.
B. The Many Definitions of Income
The IRS is not the only agency that attempts to measure income.
Many other agencies have their own reasons for caring about income,
either in order to distribute transfers or to judge the effects of other
policies. And because each agency has slightly different goals, the in-
come concepts that they use are constructed in different ways, and
none match up precisely. Here, I consider twelve other income con-
cepts beyond Haig-Simons and AGI. I discuss each of them briefly
below, and the differences between them are summarized in Table 1.
But some broader points are worth emphasizing:
First, I am not aware of another study or paper that performs this
complete of a comparison across income concepts. While several ana-
lysts and academics have made bilateral comparisons, and some cover
more than two concepts,190 this broad and nearly all-encompassing re-
view has thus far not appeared in the literature. That alone is
surprising.
Second, compiling this information involved digging rather deep
into some agencies' documentation (including, in the case of the Fed's
190 See, e.g., Dennis Fixler & David S. Johnson, Accounting for the Distribution of In-
come in the US National Accounts, in Measuring Economic Sustainability and Progress
214 (Dale W. Jorgenson, J. Steven Landefeld & Paul Schreyer eds., 2014); Eric L. Henry &
Charles D. Day, A Comparison of Income Concepts: IRS Statistics of Income, Census
Current Population Survey, and BLS Consumer Expenditure Survey, in Special Studies in
Federal Tax Statistics 149 (James Dalton & Beth Kilss eds., 2005); Mark Ledbetter, Com-
parison of BEA Estimates of Personal Income and IRS Estimates of Adjusted Gross In-
come, 87 Surv. Current Bus. 35 (2007); Barry W. Johnson & Kevin Moore, Differences in
Income Estimates Derived from Survey and Tax Data, Am. Statistical Ass'n (2008), http://
users.nber.org/-taxsim/to-taxsim/scf/Johnson Moore_ASA2008.pdf; John Ruser, Adrienne
Pilot & Charles Nelson, Alternative Measures of Income: BEA Personal Income, CPS
Money Income, and Beyond (Nov. 2007) (unpublished manuscript) (available at https://
www.bea.gov/about/pdf/AlternativemeasuresHHincomeFESAC121404.pdf).
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Survey of Consumer Finances, the ASCII-text guide for how data ana-
lysts should code answers to some survey follow-up questions). 191
Much of the easily accessible information is incomplete or only in
summary form, and it seems likely that few beyond those most inti-
mate with the data fully understand what is actually included in partic-
ular definitions. These first two points underscore one of the
arguments of this Article, that the word "income" is used to describe
many things, but that speakers are often not aware of how much one
person's or agency's definition differs from another's. As this Section
and the table shows, the differences can be stark.
Third, the particular choices about what to include in "income" and
what to exclude are generally driven by either the policy goals or the
object of study of the agency in question. The decisions are (mostly)
not arbitrary. What an agency names as "income" are those items that
it cares about in meeting its policy or analytical goals. But there are
nonetheless some idiosyncratic choices, especially when a definition
relies on the tax definition as a starting point, as several do.
Fourth, there are some notable patterns. Among the items that ap-
pear in every one of the income concepts are wages, business income,
income from property (other than realized gains), and taxable interest
and dividends. The core of each definition thus contains the major
items of labor and production that lead to cash in the hands of individ-
uals. These are the items that would make up anyone's intuitive defi-
nition of income. More interesting is the general absence of some
other items. Realized gain, for example, appears in relatively few of
the concepts, and even fewer of the concepts that do not use AGI as a
starting point. The logic seems to be that transforming an asset into
cash does not create income, rather just changes the form of a re-
source. But none of the concepts (other than Haig-Simons income)
includes unrealized gain. Which means that appreciation in asset val-
ues often goes unmeasured entirely. Analysts and policymakers using
these concepts should be aware that they may be inadvertently em-
bedding these choices and problems in their studies and policies.
Finally, as noted in the previous Section, several of these measures
are at least partly based on AGI, the measure of income for tax pur-
poses. The Census Bureau and Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) mea-
sures of income rely on independent surveys and other data, with
some supplementary information from tax and administrative
sources.192
191 Fed. Reserve Bd., Summary Listing of Questions Asked in the 2013 SCF, https://
www.federalreserve.gov/econres/files/scfoutline.2013.pdf (last visited Apr. 16, 2018).
192 See notes 202-11 and accompanying text.
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THE DEFINITIONS OF INCOME
But the CBO uses a combination of tax and Census Bureau data,
and the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) uses primarily adminis-
trative data, such as tax data, unemployment filings, and Social Secur-
ity data, as well as reliance on the Census and other surveys. 193 The
Fed's Survey of Consumer Finances explicitly tells respondents to
look at their tax returns to answer survey questions.1 94 And the Free
Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA) and Affordable Care
Act (ACA) definitions start with AGI and then make some adjust-
ments. The centrality of income measurement to tax administration,
and the enormous amounts of data collected by the IRS, make reli-
ance on tax measures of income extremely tempting.
1. NIPA Personal Income
BEA, through its National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA),
attempts to measure the production of the entire household sector (in
addition to other sectors).1 9 5 The BEA's primary task is calculating
GDP, and thus the income concept is particularly focused on produc-
tion, whether or not that production translates into cash on hand.196
Thus NIPA Personal Income includes items such as employer contri-
butions to health care and retirement insurance, as well as all in kind
and cash government transfers, but does not include most interper-
sonal transfers, such as alimony and child support.1 97
Importantly, NIPA Personal Income is the only agency definition
(other than the Census's alternative Definition 15) that includes im-
puted rent on owner-occupied housing and the only one that includes
imputed investment income, such as bank depositor services and the
interest and dividend income on insurance and pension accounts.1 98
The assets in owner-occupied housing, insurance companies, retire-
ment funds, and bank deposits make up an enormous amount of per-
sonal wealth, so it follows that the income produced from those assets
should be taken account of-though no other measure does. And not
193 See Bureau of Econ. Analysis, State Personal Income and Employment: Concepts,
Data Sources, and Statistical Methods 1-9--I-10 (2016).
194 See note 215 and accompanying text.
195 See Bureau of Econ. Analysis, Concepts and Methods of the U.S. National Income
and Product Accounts 1-1--1-2 (2017) [hereinafter NIPA Handbook].
196 See id. at 1-2; Bureau of Econ. Analysis, note 193, at 1-8.
197 See NIPA Handbook, note 195, at 2-6--2-13; Bureau of Econ. Analysis, Table 2.1:
Personal Income and Its Disposition, https://www.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?reqid=19&
step=2#reqid=19&step=3&isuri=1&1921=survey&1903=58 (last visited Apr. 3, 2018).
198 See NIPA Handbook, note 195, at 2-5; U.S. Census Bureau, Money Income in the
United States: 1997, at A-4 (1998), https://www.census.gov/prod/3/98pubs/p60-200.pdf.
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even NIPA Personal Income measures imputed household services,
like parent-provided child care. 199
The NIPA Personal Income concept also does not include capital
gain income. 200 This is not unreasonable, given that this income con-
cept is based on the idea of national production. Production at the
corporate level is counted separately, so including increases in the
prices of corporate equity as "national production" would be partly
double-counting. However, the Personal Income concept is not sy-
nonymous with full national production-it is only the measure of
production done by individuals, and does not impute corporate earn-
ings to individuals.201 Thus, capital income due to increases in the
value of capital assets goes almost completely uncounted in the Per-
sonal Income measure.
2. Census Bureau Money Income
The Census Bureau, through the Current Population Survey, mea-
sures families' "money income," which, as the name implies, is in-
tended as a measure of the resources that a family has available for
consumption. 202 It is a more bottom-up "micro" approach, compared
to the "macro" approach of the BEA. 2 0 3 It is also a significantly nar-
rower definition, since it measures mostly cash and cash equivalents,
and thus leaves out things that the BEA includes, such as employer
contributions to health care, retirement insurance, and Social Security,
in kind government transfers, and imputed rent.204 (Though, unlike
NIPA Personal Income, it includes private transfers, like gifts, ali-
mony, and child support.)
The gap between Census Bureau Money Income and BEA Personal
Income is wide and growing. One study found the gap between Cen-
sus Money Income and BEA Personal Income to be over $2 trillion in
2001.205 That gap had grown to around $5.4 trillion in 2016.206
199 See NIPA Handbook, note 195, at 2-5 (discussing how NIPA imputes nonmarket
transactions).
200 See id. at 2-7.
201 See id. at 2-13.
202 See Katz, note 188, at 9-10.
203 Id.
204 See Bernadette D. Proctor, Jessica L. Semega & Melissa A. Kollar, U.S. Census Bu-
reau, Income and Poverty in the United States: 2015, at 21 (2016). For a more thorough
discussion, see U.S. Census Bureau, note 198, at A-1 to A-4.
205 Ruser et al., note 190, at 2 (BEA estimate of $8.678 trillion vs. CPS estimate of
$6.446 trillion).
206 Bureau of Econ. Analysis, note 195 ($16 trillion). U.S. Census Bureau, Historical
Income Tables: People, https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/income-pov-
erty/historical-income-people.html (follow "All Races" hyperlink underneath Table P-1:
Total CPS Population and Per Capita Income) ($10.6 trillion).
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Recognizing the relative meagerness of the Money Income defini-
tion, the Census Bureau also uses fifteen other "alternative" defini-
tions of income for various purposes (underscoring how many
definitions are possible).207 Definition 15 is the broadest, including in
kind government transfers and realized gain, as well as the employer's
contribution to retirement and the employee's share of payroll taxes
(presumably under the view that they are also income contributed to
retirement savings). 208 On the Census Bureau's website, researchers
can also construct their own definition of income out of forty-two sep-
arately compiled components of income. 209
3. Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Expenditure Survey
Income
The Consumer Expenditure Survey (CE) is conducted by the BLS
primarily for revisions to the CPI index of inflation,210 and it is thus
especially focused on expenditures (as opposed to the BEA's focus on
production and the Census's focus on money). The concept lines up
closely to the Census's Money Income definition, however (the Cen-
sus Bureau performs both surveys). Differences include the inclusion
of employer-provided noncash fringe benefits in the Census definition
but not the BLS definition. The BLS also only includes transfers from
others if they are regular, as opposed to lump sum, and does not de-
duct the employee's share of payroll taxes.211 Presumably these dif-
ferences are driven by a desire to get the most accurate picture of the
income that flows into an individual's purchases of consumer goods.
4. Congressional Budget Office Before-Tax Income
CBO is especially interested in measuring or estimating the distri-
butional effects of tax and other legislative changes. For this purpose,
they use three income measures: market income, market income after
transfers but before taxes (what I call "Before-Tax Income"), and
207 See U.S. Census Bureau, note 204, at A-4.
208 See id.; U.S. Census Bureau, Alternative Measures of Income, https://
www.census.gov/topics/income-poverty/income/about/glossary/alternative-measures.html
(last updated May 11, 2016).
209 U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey (CPS), http://www.census.gov/cps/
data/incdef.html.
210 See Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Expenditure Survey, http://www.bls.gov/
cex.
211 See Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Expenditure Survey Glossary (2015),
http://www.bls.gov/cex/csxgloss.htm (providing the definition for "Income"); Bureau of La-
bor Statistics, Consumer Expenditure Survey, Table 1203: Income Before Taxes (2015),
http://www.bls.gov/cex/2015/combined/income.pdf.
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market income after taxes and transfers.212 I chose Before-Tax In-
come because it is the broadest measure. It essentially takes AGI and
corrects for certain tax expenditures, such as the exclusion of interest
on state and local bonds and the partial exclusion of some retirement
and Social Security income.213 It also adds in cash and in kind govern-
ment transfers, like SNAP and Medicaid, but does not include trans-
fers through the tax system, such as the Earned Income Tax Credit. It
also aims to get a fuller picture of income by including the employer's
portion of the payroll tax and the proportionate share of corporate
taxes borne by capital and labor.214 Both would be offset in the after-
tax income measure, but including them in the pretax measure allows
CBO to better understand the distributive consequences.
5. Federal Reserve Bulletin Income
The Federal Reserve publishes what it calls "Bulletin Income," de-
rived from its Survey of Consumer Finances. The Fed is particularly
concerned with household balance sheets-stocks, rather than flows-
and its income measure reflects that. For example, it includes a rela-
tively broad definition of capital income, including capital gains (un-
like the BEA, Census, and BLS measure).215 It also includes the
value of private cash transfers, like alimony and child support, govern-
ment cash transfers, and in kind government transfers with respect to
housing.216 (I suspect that including transfers for housing but not
health care reflects the Fed's focus on assets and liabilities.) However,
because the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) survey refers indi-
viduals to their tax returns to answer some of the questions about in-
come, Bulletin Income also mirrors AGI in some odd ways, such as
not including employer contributions for health care and retirement in
labor income, including only taxable fringe benefits, and not including
veterans' payments.217 Finally, and uniquely among the income mea-
sures here, the SCF seems to allow for respondents to declare nega-
tive income, due to excessive losses. This is consistent with the Haig-
Simons concept, and also with the Fed's focus on household balance
212 See, e.g., Cong. Budget Office, Trends in the Distribution of Household Income Be-
tween 1979 and 2007, at 33-34 (2011), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/112th-con-
gress-2011-2012/reports/10-25-householdincomeO.pdf.
213 See id. at 33.
214 Id.
215 Fed. Reserve Bd., note 191, at 21 (indicating that income includes "[g]ains or losses
on stocks, bonds, mutual funds").
216 Id. at 21-22; Fed. Reserve Bd., Codebook for 2013 Survey of Consumer Finances,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/files/codebk20l3.txt (describing these sources of
income, particularly in the questions under Code x5725).
217 Id.
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sheets, but "negative income" is a concept that most other agencies do
not consider.
6. SNAP, SSI, FAFSA, ACA
Finally, I consider the income measures used to determine eligibility
for various government transfers. These measures, along with the
CBO's, are distinct from the others in measuring income largely for
social policy reasons, rather than national accounting. The choices of
what to include and exclude somewhat reflect that difference.
SNAP, often referred to as "food stamps," provides cash assistance
for low-income individuals in the purchase of food. Supplemental Se-
curity Income (SSI) provides additional support under Social Security
for disabled individuals. FAFSA determines students' eligibility for
Pell Grants, subsidized federal loans, and other educational transfers.
And the Modified Adjusted Gross Income measure determines the
size of the premium support tax credits used to subsidize individuals'
purchase of health insurance through the ACA exchanges.
Each measure differs, in sometimes idiosyncratic ways. For exam-
ple, the measure of income for purposes of SNAP appears to allow net
losses from farming activity but not net losses from other activities.218
SSI Countable Income does not appear to count capital gains, because
that is just a shift in the character of a resource, not an increase in
resources.219 Because SSI (along with SNAP and FAFSA) looks not
only at income but also resources, counting capital gains would pre-
sumably be a form of double-counting (though SNAP and FAFSA
both include capital gains in income). SSI also explicitly focuses on
the income and resources needed to procure food and shelter, and
therefore counts in kind transfers of food and shelter as income (since
they offset the demands on cash for food and shelter). 220
A final, particularly important feature of these measures is
FAFSA's and the ACA's reliance on AGI as the baseline measure.
Both start with AGI and make certain adjustments. In the case of
FAFSA, tax-expenditure-type items, such as tax-exempt interest,
workers' compensation, and veterans' benefits are added back in.2 21
Modified Adjusted Gross Income for the ACA is only AGI plus un-
218 See 7 U.S.C. § 2014(d)(9) (2012). My instinct is that this is somehow valued by the
farm lobby, but I am at a loss to explain why their focus is only on making farmers more
eligible for SNAP rather than everyone. Anything that lowers income and increases over-
all eligibility for SNAP ought to be valued by agricultural interests.
219 See 20 C.F.R. § 416.1103(c) (2017).
220 See id. at § 416.1130(b).
221 See 20 U.S.C. § 1087vv.
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taxed foreign income, tax-exempt interest, and excluded Social Secur-
ity benefits. 222
While this sample is too small to allow for firm conclusions, it is
telling that two of the newer government transfer programs do not set
out to create an income measure from scratch, but instead start with
an existing measure (AGI) and make adjustments. That reliance is
not entirely unwarranted-after all, these programs and the tax sys-
tem share some overall goals regarding distributive justice, and it
would be expected that the income measure used to assign tax bur-
dens is similar to the one used to determine transfers. That said, the
more established SNAP and SSI programs are not nearly as reliant on
AGI, perhaps because of an understanding that many other issues are
at play in measuring AGI, not just a concern with fairness.
If so, then Congress' recent use of AGI in transfer programs raises
some concern. If future government programs key benefits to need
rather than being universal-as seems likely223-then the tax measure
of income may become even more prominent. More use of AGI could
serve to further entrench the particular policy choices embedded
within that definition.
C. Income Studies
To illustrate the importance of considering the different definitions
of income and how they are used, I now look briefly at the trajectory
of perhaps the most important work in income inequality in the last
two decades, the work of Piketty, Saez, and co-authors, as well as a
competing line of literature from Jeff Larimore, Richard Burkhauser,
and co-authors. My purpose here is not to provide a definitive over-
view of their work or to take sides, but rather to show how research
and conclusions can change significantly depending on income defini-
tions, and also that researchers are beginning to grapple with the lim-
its of tax-driven definitions of income. An important irony illustrated
by this is that researchers are moving beyond tax-driven definitions of
income at the same time that policymakers are doubling down, espe-
cially through the ACA and FAFSA income concepts.
In work that culminated in a 2003 paper (which continues to be
updated online with more recent data), 2 2 4 Piketty and Saez tackled
the issue of income inequality, and especially the growth in the very
222 See IRC § 36B(d)(2)(B).
223 See John R. Brooks, Quasi-Public Spending, 104 Geo. L.J. 1057, 1072-78 (2016) (dis-
cussing budget constraints that drive governments to limit nominal expenditures to subsi-
dies and distributional adjustments rather than full provision).
224 Piketty & Saez, note 27; Update at https//eml.berkeley.edu/saez/ (under Income and
Wealth Inequality) (last updated June 2016).
Imaged with the permission of Tax Law Review of New York University School of Law
304 [Vol. 71:TAX LAW REVIEW
THE DEFINITIONS OF INCOME
top shares of income. Their challenge was that survey data could not
give them an answer, because of top-coding and a lack of over-
sampling. Their solution was to use tax data instead, following the
method of Simon Kuznets.225 Using tax data from 1913 to 1998, they
show that the share of income earned by the top income groups fol-
lowed a U-shape over that period, with very high shares early and late
in the period, but somewhat lower during World War II and the post-
war period.226 Their finding that top income shares have been grow-
ing in recent decades has had a major effect on policy discussion
around income inequality.
While tax data can provide more reliable data on top income share
groups, it is-as we well know by this point in the Article-an imper-
fect measure of income. It does not include several important catego-
ries of income, including employer-provided health care and other
excluded fringe benefits, many government transfers (both cash and in
kind), and not all Social Security, all of which are important categories
of income for lower- and middle-income taxpayers. Piketty and Saez
also explicitly exclude capital gain income and tax-exempt interest,
both of which are important categories of income for high-income
taxpayers. 227
A more subtle methodological issue arises from the fact that Piketty
and Saez are trying to compute shares of income, not just levels of
income. To do that, they need a denominator that reflects total na-
tional income. Ideally, they would use total income as reported on tax
returns, to be consistent with their numerators, but this is not possible
since prior to 1945 only higher-income individuals paid the income tax
and reported their incomes. 228 Thus, the tax data does not have a
measure (even an imperfect one) of total income prior to 1945.229 In-
stead, they use NIPA Personal Income, as Kuznets did.2 3 0
However, the two concepts-the tax and NIPA measures-include
different items, as discussed above and shown in Table 1. To address
this mismatch, Kuznets made a number of adjustments to national in-
come in order to bring it closer to the tax measure of income. 231 It is
225 Id. at 1-2; Simon Kuznets, Shares of Upper Income Groups in Income and Savings
(1953).
226 Piketty & Saez, note 27, at 11.
227 See Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, Income and Wage Inequality in the United
States, 1913-2002, in Top Incomes Over the 20th Century: A Contrast Between Continen-
tal European and English-Speaking Countries 198 n.70 (Anthony B. Atkinson & Thomas
Piketty eds., 2007).
228 See Carolyn C. Jones, Class Tax to Mass Tax: The Role of Propaganda in the Expan-
sion of the Income Tax During World War II, 37 Buff. L. Rev. 685, 685 (1989).
229 See Piketty & Saez, note 27, at 4 (discussing the problem).
230 Id. at 6 n.9; see Kuznets, note 225; Subsection V.B.1.
231 See Kuznets, note 225, at 5.
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not clear whether Piketty and Saez make the same adjustments, how-
ever. These adjustments should affect income shares, since the items
included or excluded from one or the other measure affect individuals
differently. For example, imputed rent from owner-occupied housing
likely accrues more to higher-income individuals. If imputed rent is in
the denominator (since it is included in the NIPA measure) but not
the numerator, this would bias the top income shares downward.
Other items, like disability and workers' compensation payments
probably cut the other way.
If the differences between the tax and NIPA income measures were
consistent over time, this might be less of a concern, at least for show-
ing trends. However, the differences between the tax and NIPA mea-
sures of income is not static, but may be growing in recent years, with
increasing amounts of income not in the tax base.2 32 Thus, some of
the movement in income shares may reflect just these relative changes
in the two income measures, rather than changes in actual income
inequality.
This is not to challenge the overall thrust of the work, and it is un-
likely that these issues would affect the direction of the trend that they
show. But they could have a material effect on the levels and the rate
of change. For example, Burkhauser, Larrimore, and Simon show
that using different measures of income can increase the growth rate
in middle class incomes. 233 Specifically, they include the value of post-
tax transfers (cash and some in kind), and also adjust for household
size. They also use the same income concept for both the numerator
and the denominator-CPS Money Income-avoiding the problem
Piketty and Saez faced. But this reintroduces other problems, like the
top-coding of top incomes and the absence of some important items of
income from the CPS concept. 234 The CPS also does not include data
on tax credits, tax liabilities, or the value of in kind benefits, which
Burkhauser, Larrimore & Simon instead impute using tax data.2 3 5
Based on a recent paper, Piketty and Saez seem to consider the
income definition question to be of first order importance. Piketty,
Saez, & Zucman point out that previous studies like their own do not
capture the full picture of "national income," since they look only at
tax data, fail to take account of taxes, transfers, and spending on pub-
lic goods, and, by looking at tax units rather than individuals, do not
232 See Jesse Bricker, Alice M. Henriques, Jake A. Krimmel & John E. Sabelhaus, Mea-
suring Income and Wealth at the Top Using Administrative and Survey Data, 1 Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity 261, 305 (2016), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/
uploads/2016/03/brickertextspringl6bpea.pdf; Thomas Piketty, Saez et al., note 28, at 563.
233 Burkhauser, et al., Second Opinion, note 29.
234 See text accompanying notes 224-25.
235 Burkhauser et al., Second Opinion, note 29, at 11.
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capture the profound changes in female labor force participation over
time. 2 3 6 In the new paper, they instead look at the distribution of na-
tional income-that is, total production-with some adjustments, such
as imputing corporate retained earnings to individuals in proportion
to their observed dividend and realized capital gain income.237 They
also make some substantial (and disputable) assumptions about the
incidence of both taxes and public goods expenditures.238
They find a similar U-shaped trend in the top income shares as the
2003 Piketty & Saez paper but with somewhat less concentration of
pretax income at the top 10%, though still high and sharply rising in
recent years.239 Expanding the definition of income appears to have
had a more significant effect on top-10% incomes in years before
1986, increasing the share of income earned by the top 10% by more
than ten percentage points in some years.240 They attribute this to
high levels of undistributed corporate retained earnings in earlier peri-
ods, and also to the growth in capital income earned by pension funds
in later periods. 241 Moreover, the share of the bottom 90% is increas-
ingly made up of tax-exempt income, such as fringe benefits. They
find that tax-exempt labor income made up 13% of bottom-90% in-
come in 1962, but 23% of bottom-90% income today.242
At the same time that Piketty and Saez have addressed weaknesses
in the tax definition of income by using survey data, a paper by Lar-
rimore, Burkhauser, Gerald Auten, and Philip Armour addresses
weaknesses in survey definitions of income by adding tax data (in con-
trast to the 2012 paper that uses only CPS data).243 They also go be-
yond the approach of Piketty, Saez, and Zucman to consider accrued
capital gains from both housing and corporate stock.244 With this and
other differences, they also find that the top 1% share of income has
increased in recent years, though less dramatically than shown in the
2003 Piketty & Saez study. In the end, however, the two papers end
236 Piketty et al., note 28, at 554.
237 Id. at 568.
238 See id. at 569-73.
239 Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Distributional National Ac-
counts: Methods and Estimates for the United States 30-31, 53 fig.12 (Nat'l Bureau Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 22945, 2016), http://www.nber.org/papers/w22945.pdf
240 Piketty et al., note 28, at 588-89.
241 The income earned by pension funds is distributed more equally than corporate re-
tained earnings, and so it does not increase inequality as much. See id. at 589 n.2.
242 Id. at 580-81.
243 See Larrimore et al, Recent Trends, note 29, at 1-2.
244 Piketty et al., note 28, calculate capital gain by attributing current-year corporate
earnings to individuals in proportion to their realized dividend and capital gain income. Id.
at 568. As Larrimore et al., Recent Trends, note 29, points out, this fails to capture in-
crease in stock prices based on investor perceptions of future corporate earnings. Id. at 6-
7.
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up in a similar spot, though swapping places. Piketty, Saez, and
Zucman find that the top-1% share of post-tax national income (their
broadest measure that includes the effects of taxes and transfers) in
2014 is 15%, with Larrimore, Burkhauser, Auten, and Armour finding
that the top-1% share of "comprehensive income" in 2013 is 16.5%.245
While both are slightly lower than the estimates in the earlier Piketty
and Saez paper, they are still substantial and growing.
What we can take from these papers (in addition to their actual
conclusions), is that a tax definition of income, and the data on in-
come collected by the IRS, is hugely valuable to researchers and
sometimes can provide a decent, though imperfect, snapshot of rela-
tive economic positions and trends. But the tax data can only go so
far, and the forms of income that it misses-especially unrealized cap-
ital gains, fringe benefits, and imputed income from owner-occupied
housing-are significant and have material effects on both levels of
income and degrees of inequality. Researchers are increasingly aware
of the first order importance of these differences, and one hopes that
Congress and other policymakers will follow suit.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that income is not capable of a single, pure,
and rigorous definition, and that any income definition instead must
be constructed based on the underlying goals or purposes of the rele-
vant policy or study. Different parties will include or exclude different
items based on particular policy goals or issues under study, and with
good reason. This understanding can help us to better contextualize
some debates in the literature, such as the role of tax expenditure
analysis and optimal income tax theory. The mutability of income can
also be demonstrated by the multitude of definitions that different
government agencies use for different purposes.
This matters for a couple of reasons. First, the concept of "income"
carries great weight. It is our index of equality, and the basis that we
use for taxes, transfers, distributive analysis, and broader normative
comparisons. But we can only study what we measure, so the choice
of what is "income" and what is not has important effects on those
same dimensions.
But, second, knowing that income is a constructed concept allows us
to better answer the question "What is income?" Ultimately, income
is simply the name that we use to describe the set of things that we
measure for purposes of making normative comparisons. This is not
to say that it can be literally anything at all, only that whether an item
245 Piketty et al., note 28, at 575 tbl.1; Larrimore et al., Recent Trends, note 29, at 28.
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is or is not in the Haig-Simons or some other comprehensive defini-
tion is beside the point. Maybe we care that the Fliigeladjutant gets
free carriage rides, maybe we do not, but in no way is a tax, or other,
agency obligated to include those rides in his income just because
some particular definition might demand that. What a tax agency, and
Congress, is obligated to do is ensure that the items included in the
income definition for tax purposes are those items that it believes are
appropriate in assigning relative tax burdens.246
Pushing against this view, however, is the importance of the tax def-
inition of income in nontax policy areas. The ubiquity of taxation, the
detail of the Code, the centrality of income measurement to the IRS
mission, and the enormous amount of data the IRS collects makes
reliance on tax definitions of income tempting to policymakers and
researchers. But if AGI is just one possible measure of income, and
one inherently imbued with tax policy choices (some reasonable, some
not), then policymakers and researchers must be very careful and de-
liberate in using it. In the story this Article tells, researchers are com-
ing to grips with these issues just as policymakers may be relying even
more heavily on AGI.
The enormous simplification and administrative benefits that come
from using AGI mean that Congress and other agencies will likely
continue to rely on AGI to some degree. If so, they should also be
sensitive to nontax issues when considering changes to the tax base,
despite the claim above that the government may assign tax burdens
however it wishes. This is not because they ought to follow some par-
ticular definition of income-indeed, because income definitions fol-
low in part from policy goals, it is rather because there are now
multiple policies, and therefore multiple definitions of income, in play,
and AGI is asked to fill them all. It may be asking too much of Con-
gress for it to consider the effects of AGI changes on, for example,
Pell Grant eligibility or the Fed's Survey of Consumer Finances, but
AGI affects those and more. Our definitions of income overlap and
intertwine in important, often unseen ways, and it is incumbent on all
of us to understand that income is not a single thing, a single idea, but
rather a vast range of different concepts, definitions, norms, and
policies.
246 This is somewhat similar to Victor Thuronyi's argument that income can be defined
only by reference to equity, that is, that something is income if it is fair to determine tax
burdens based on it. See Thuronyi, note 46, at 53-55. Where I differ with Thuronyi is that
I do not believe even fairness is required. Policymakers are welcome to incorporate their
fairness views in the income definition, but the definition may also incorporate other
norms or policies, and it would be equally valid. The point only is that the definition fol-
lows from whatever the goals are.
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